On August 15, 1808, Paris was in full bloom. In the evening, the city was brightly illuminated; colorful fireworks were set off in the squares in front of the crowds; music could be heard until late at night. The capital was celebrating the emperor's birthday. It was known that he had arrived in Saint-Cloud the day before, on the 14th. On the 15th, speaking on the day of the Feast of the Empire, Napoleon I said: "I feel happy to be back in my good Paris." He added that "the expressions of joy and devotion of the people that he met on the way" gave him the impression that he had never left the city.

Count P. A. Tolstoy, the Russian ambassador in Paris, reported on the celebration of August 15 in France, expressing doubt: was the joy of the people so great?1 . Tolstoy was an opponent of the union of Russia with France, 2 and his judgments should be taken critically. Yet Tolstoy was right about one thing: in August 1808, Napoleon, despite his apparent serenity, did have a lot on his mind. In a letter to his brother Joseph dated August 16, that is, the day after the holiday, Napoleon wrote:: "Everything that is happening in Spain is extremely deplorable. You might think that the army is commanded not by generals, but by postal officials. How could you leave Spain like that, without a reason, without even knowing what the enemy was doing? " 3 It was a reprimand to the King of Spain. But Napoleon was not only concerned about the situation on the Iberian Peninsula. Soberly assessing the significance of the French capitulation to the Spanish on July 22, 1808 at Baylen, he rightly believed that the immediate and most likely consequence of the Baylen catastrophe would be a new war with Austria.

The Austrian ambassador in Paris at that time was Count (later Prince) Clement Metternich. In January 1848, F. Engels, in his article "The Beginning of the End of Austria," predicted the imminent end of the man who for many years had controlled the "creaking state machine" of Austria, the "cowardly swindler and treacherous murderer Metternich."4 It wasn't often that predictions were fulfilled so quickly. Two months later, in March 1848, Metternich, disguised in someone else's clothes, fled from Vienna to England, fleeing from popular anger. In 1808, he was 40 years younger. He was a successful debuting diplomat - elegant, intelligent, and deceitful; a ladies ' man and a smooth talker, who could hide his vices under the veneer of a fashionable young man who seemed to think only of how to dispel his spleen. In search of imaginary entertainment, he made extensive contacts in Paris, in particular a suspicious friendship with Talleyrand, who had left the post of Foreign Minister a year earlier, and Joseph Fouche, the Minister of Police, which he shared (like all his other connections - privately) with Count Tolstoy .5 Depending on the situation-

Written for Voprosy Istorii magazine version of a chapter from the book Napoleon Bonaparte, which is being published by Mysl publishing house this year.

1 "Collection of the Russian Historical Society" (hereinafter-RIO), vol. 89, 1893, N 186, pp. 655-656; see also Tolstoy's reports of August 6(18), 1808, N 185 and 189, pp. 644-646.

2 Archive of Foreign Policy of Russia (hereinafter referred to as AVPR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, 1251.

3 "Lettres inedites de Napoleon I". Publ. par L. Lecestre. Vol. 1. P. 1897, N 336, pp. 229 - 230.

4 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 4, p. 471.

5 Fouche noted that Metternich acted primarily through women (J. Fouche. Memoires. T. II. P. 1824, pp. 180 - 182).

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Sometimes he pretended to be a loyal knight of legitimism, sometimes a man of advanced ideas, almost a champion of the "rights of the nation". With a natural aptitude and even a talent for secret intrigues, a dark and impure game that is passed off as a high art of diplomacy thanks to his unshakable aplomb, he managed to turn the Austrian embassy in Paris into an international headquarters for secret intrigues. Here was a spider's web that stretched to all corners of Europe. For all that, with an innate predisposition to treachery and treachery that made him particularly inventive in all sorts of deceptions, Metternich, as a politician and as a diplomat, made amazing mistakes and mistakes. He was always wrong, and others would never get away with it. Metternich had the happy gift of noticing and recording only the mistakes of others. He never acknowledged his own: they "didn't exist." And this unshakeable conviction of his constant and, so to speak, universal rightness partly allowed him to maintain for almost half a century the reputation of an outstanding statesman .6
On August 15, at a large diplomatic reception, Napoleon asked Metternich: who is Austria arming against? The Austrian ambassador denied everything. He sought to reassure the Emperor of the" deepest peacefulness " of the Habsburgs. Napoleon did not dispute this statement, but a conversation with Metternich confirmed him in the opinion that Vienna was preparing for war .7 Since June 1808, rumors of an imminent war between Austria and France began to spread initially in the narrow diplomatic sphere, and then in wider circles. Baron Stackelberg, the czar's ambassador to the Berlin court, reported to St. Petersburg that since the spring the French troops stationed in Prussia had been growing more convinced that the gap between the two powers was close. 8 But was not the very appearance of these rumors, in fact, their refutation? It has long been established - and Jacques Godchaux has recently reminded us that it has become an axiom-that Napoleon's strategy was based primarily on surprise. 9 Meanwhile, rumors about the possibility of war between France and Austria have been rising again and again. In both July and August, Stackelberg again signaled to Vienna and Paris about the growing talk about the proximity of war .10
Napoleon did not really want a war with Austria at that time. Not because he promised that there would be no more war. He had broken promises more than once, and it didn't bother him at all. France did not need this war at that time: under the Peace of Pressburg, it received from Austria everything that it could give, and the overthrow of the Habsburg dynasty was not part of its task. He knew that France did not want another war, and he knew perfectly well that the country needed peace. The main thing that made him shy away from the Austrian war was the incompleteness, not to say worse, of the "Spanish affair"he had begun. Getting involved in a war in the east before victory was achieved in the south-this was contrary to his military concept. To prevent war with Austria, as well as to solve many other problems, Napoleon kept in reserve, as he believed, a powerful tool that he reserved for a last resort: an alliance with Russia.

The alliance with Russia continued to occupy the main place in all political, especially foreign policy, calculations of Napoleon. He valued it extremely highly, considered it the most important achievement of his previous years, and pinned great hopes on it in the future. One can easily verify this by referring to Napoleon's post-Tilsit business correspondence, especially his letters to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Caulaincourt, and his predecessor Savary, as well as to Jo-

6 См. "Aus Metternich's nachgelassenen Papieren". Bd. 1 - 8. Wien. 1880 - 1884 (trad. franc.: P. 1880 - 1889); A. O. Meyer. Furst Metternich. B. 1924; G. Bertier de Sauvigny. Metternich et son temps. P. 1959. Recent years have been marked by the appearance of a number of apologetic works by Western historians about Metternich (H. A. Hissinger, A. G. Haas, R. A. Kann etc.).

7 A full account of this conversation is given in the appendix to P. A. Tolstoy's report: RIO, vol. 89, pp. 646-649.

8 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chancellery, 1808, d. 422. l. 9.

9 J. Godechot. Napoleon. P. 1969, p. 123.

10 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chancellery, 1808, d. 422, ll. 13, 32.

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zeph Bonaparte and stepson Eugene Beauharnais 11 . Historians could not fail to recognize Napoleon's extreme enthusiasm for an alliance with Russia. Some of them were ready to bring this statement to an arbitrary interpretation. When, for example, Jacques Benville wrote that "Napoleon was the victim of a Russian mirage" 12 , the grossly biased nature of his interpretation of well-known facts is so obvious that it does not even require refutation. More serious circumstances deserve attention. The idea expressed by Bonaparte as early as 1801 that "only Russia can be an ally of France" remained leading in his foreign policy concept for all subsequent years. Despite all the differences between bourgeois France and feudal-feudal Russia, this alliance was the most promising. After Tilsit, the idea was supplemented with a new thesis: "In agreement with Russia, we have no one to fear." The thesis itself was correct. But it remained true only as long as this agreement was maintained. The fatal internal contradiction of Napoleon's" Russian policy " lay precisely in the fact that, practically understanding the need to maintain an alliance with Russia, his actions often affected the direct interests of his ally. The agreement was based, of course, not on "feelings", which were widely and willingly discussed, but on real interests. The latter covered a wide range of issues, ranging from plans for the division of the "Turkish inheritance" to specific issues of the continental blockade or the withdrawal of French occupation forces from Prussia. Naturally, on many issues, the point of view of the allies did not coincide. All that mattered to Napoleon was to prevent these differences from escalating into conflict and jeopardizing the alliance itself.

The Erfurt meeting of the two emperors, which had long been planned, took place only in September-October 1808, in a situation unfavorable for France. Behind them were the capitulations of the French army in Spain (Bailen) and in Portugal (Sintra); ahead - the threat of war with Austria. Napoleon tried to compensate for the unsatisfactoriness of his position by the external pomp of the meeting. All allied or friendly rulers from numerous German states were invited to the meeting of the two emperors. The "Parterre of kings" was supplemented by famous artists of the French stage, led by the famous tragedian F.-J. Talma. But in the 15 months since Tilsit, Napoleon got to know Alexander I better. He no longer thought of the other man as kind and trusting, and he knew that Alexander could not be fooled by phrases or theatrical effects: he himself was a master in this genre. Indeed, the" parterre of kings " did not make any impression on Alexander. His rough diary entries only soberly record the numerous requests heaped upon him by minor German sovereigns. Almost all of them, from the Duke of Mecklenburg to the Prince of Thurn and Taxis, consistently begged for an increase in their state status or territorial increment .13 But the strengthening of friendship with Russia was extremely necessary for Napoleon. On the eve of Erfurt, on September 8, he finally signed a treaty with the Prussian king for the withdrawal of French troops from Prussia .14 This was done, of course, not for the sake of the Prussian king, but for the sake of Russia.

The Erfurt Rendezvous, or Erfurt celebrations, which lasted two weeks, took place in two strictly demarcated areas. The formal, formal side of Erfurt, facing the crowded and glittering local society-titled nobles, royal princes, diplomats, marshals, generals, ministers, dignitaries, celebrities of art and the first beauties of Europe, presented everything performed on the stage by the main characters (and there were only two of them), in a pink, almost idyllic way. the light. The touching immutability of feelings, the eternity of friendship between two sovereigns, the inviolability of the union of two powerful empires were played out,

11 RIO, vol. 83, 1893, NN 1, 17, 18, 19, 28, 37, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 55, 74; ibid., correspondence of Napoleon and Alexander I (pp. 287-297); vol. 88 (correspondence from June 1807 to April 1808), 89 (correspondence to Erfurt).

12 J. Bainville. Napoleon. P. 1969, p. 269.

13 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, 1808, Erfurt, d. 3249, ll. 2, 3.

14 "Recueil des Traites de la France". Ed. par de Clercq. T. II. P. 1880, pp. 270 - 273. The amount of the contribution from Prussia was set at 140 million francs. In Erfurt, Alexander I managed to reduce it by 20 million rubles.

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complete mutual understanding, mutual deep respect. Looking at these smiling and implanted companions, strolling hand in hand through the lighted halls of the Erfurt Palace, or appearing on horseback in the woods outside the city, followed respectfully by a retinue in gold-embroidered general's uniforms, or in the evening, in the theater box, always close by and still with the same friendly smile - who could have said that? doubt the strength of the union? 15 .

From this ostentatious side, as a performance, as a striking demonstration of the inviolability of the Franco-Russian alliance, Erfurt, perhaps, was a success for Napoleon. Those two weeks unfolded as an extravaganza of receptions, balls, plays, dinner parties and concerts, which followed each other in a varied and always interesting program. The two-day stay in Erfurt was interrupted by a trip to Weimar, that German Athens. Duke Charles Augustus made sure to welcome the distinguished guests. There was everything from hunting in the park, where deer and fallow deer were happily "caught" under the guns of the august shooters, to old-fashioned theatrical performances with flowers and poems. The actor's flair inspired Napoleon to improvise. At a formal, formal dinner for 16 people (only for sovereigns), he puzzled the monarchs gathered at the table with an amazing knowledge of German history. When one of the interlocutors, speaking of the "Golden Bull", dated it to 1409, Napoleon corrected him: "It was published in 1356, in the reign of the Emperor Charles IV." To the respectful question of how and when his Imperial Majesty could have studied such special subjects, Napoleon, after a little thought, replied:: "When I was a second lieutenant in the artillery..." He paused for a moment, looked once more at the monarchs sitting solemnly at the table covered with silver dishes, crystal, viands, and corrected himself: "When I had the honor of being a second lieutenant of artillery in the Balance..., I read a lot." In the presence of the Emperor of Russia, the king of Bavaria from the Wittelsbach dynasty, who had held the throne since the twelfth century, the kings of Württemberg and Saxony, and a dozen other German sovereigns, this carelessly proud "when I had the honor of being a second lieutenant" was like a thunderbolt. Everyone was silent for a while...

Later, he had a long conversation with the poets Goethe and Wieland. It was a conversation of equals. Napoleon kept German monarchs waiting in the waiting room, but he tried to show his respect for great writers in every possible way: no patronizing notes, no decretal judgments. Wolfgang Goethe was not for him a privy councillor of Duke Charles Augustus, but, as he emphasized, the creator of the "Sufferings of Young Werther", which he read in his younger years, and the greatest writer in Europe... However, in this game, he was not always lucky. On October 9, he wrote to the Empress Josephine: "I was at a ball in Weimar. The Emperor Alexander danced, but I didn't; forty years is forty years."16 In Erfurt, for the first time, he began to complain about his age. But otherwise, judging by his letters, he was satisfied. He wrote brief notes to Joseph Bonaparte and Marshal Murat: "Everything is going as well as possible" 17 . He told Josephine the same thing: "Everything is going well. I am pleased with Alexander; he should be pleased with me; if he were a woman, I think it would be my beloved. " 18 However, did everything really go "as well as possible"? Reliable documents, which have long been available to historians, prove that this was only a game. For whether-

15 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, 1808, dd. 3249, 3250, 3254. For the Erfurt Rendezvous, see "Foreign Policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries". Documents of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Series I (hereinafter-VLOOKUP). Vol. IV. M. 1968, NN 155, 158-162, pp. 645-647, 649-650; RIO. Vol. 89, N 209-213; vel. kn. Nikolai Mikhailovich. Diplomatic relations between Russia and France... 1808-1812. Tt. I-II. SPb. 1905; letter of Alexander I to Maria Feodorovna. "Russian Antiquity", Vol. 98, 1899, book IV; N. K. Shilder. Imperator Alexander I. T. II. St. Petersburg, 1897, pp. 229 - 248; "Correspondance de Napoleon I. P. 1860 - 1869 (hereinafter - "Corr."). Vol. 17, NN 14348-14354, 14364-14374; "Memoires du due de Rovigo". Vol. III-IV. P. 1828; S. Talleyrand. Memoirs. M.-L. 1934, pp. 183-218; A. Vandal. Napoleon and Alexander I. T. I. St. Petersburg, 1910, pp. 412-501; G. Lacour-Gayet. Talleyrand. Vol. II. P. 1933, pp. 238-254; E. Dard. Napoleon et Talleyrand. P. 1935, pp. 203 - 271.

16 "Lettres de Napoleon a Josephine". T. II. P. 1833, pp. 22 - 23.

17 A. Vandal. Edict. soch. Vol. I, pp. 445-446.

18 "Lettres de Napoleon a Josephine". T. II, pp. 29 sqq.

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the front of the Erfurt Rendezvous, behind friendly handshakes and smiles, was an unseen and unexpectedly sharp struggle.

For more than a year, Napoleon received repeated assurances from Alexander himself, and especially from Caulaincourt, of the strength of the friendly alliance between Russia and France. True, the frenzy of Tilsit quickly dissipated, sober calculations pushed aside sentiment, if there had ever been any; after Savary's return and long conversations with him, Napoleon realized that Alexander was both more complex and smarter than he had initially assumed .19 Much later, on St. Helena, when he compared Alexander to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, he said: "The Russian Emperor was a man who stood infinitely above all these others. He has intelligence, grace, education; he is seductive; but he is not trustworthy, he is not sincere, he is a true Byzantine of the decline of the empire... If I die here, he will be my true heir in Europe. " 20 In the mouth of a miserly Napoleon, this is a high assessment, but it was formed gradually. Before Erfurt, Napoleon had already assessed Alexander quite soberly, but at the same time he was firmly convinced of the friendly nature of the meeting. In Erfurt, he felt something new and different. Alexander was amiable, benevolent, and willing to meet Napoleon halfway in small details, but he was already a completely different person from what he had been in Tilsit. Disagreements were found on almost all issues, and Alexander not only did not seek ways to mitigate them, but, on the contrary, did not want to give in to anything. "He became unshakable," wrote Caulaincourt. It came to violent scenes, and Alexander threatened that he would leave on 21 . Napoleon had to make concessions. In search of an explanation for the tsar's sudden change in behavior, Napoleon initially attributed everything to the failures of the French in Spain. But, apparently, there was something else, maybe someone was betraying Napoleon? He suspected Lunn. By order of the emperor, he went to meet Alexander I and the tsar liked him: Alexander awarded Lannes the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. Until the end of the Erfurt rendezvous, Napoleon never found out the truth.

And the truth was just around the corner. Napoleon was betrayed and sold out by Talleyrand. Bonaparte had long distrusted him. And precisely because he did not trust him, he removed the Prince of Benevento from the leadership of foreign policy. Napoleon's mistake in 1808 is all the more striking. He invited Talleyrand to participate in the Erfurt negotiations and entrusted him with the most delicate mission - to make it clear to Alexander that Napoleon would like to be related to the tsar by marrying his sister. It is psychologically difficult to explain Napoleon's course of action. How could he entrust the conduct of important political negotiations (and at that time for France there was nothing more important than an alliance with Russia!) the person who aroused his suspicions? Nevertheless, in Erfurt, he had unlimited confidence in him.

This man had conspired with Metternich in Paris, and in Erfurt, when he was alone with Alexander in the house of the Princess de Thurn-et-Taxis, he immediately openly opposed Napoleon. "Sire, why did you come here? The task of saving Europe has fallen to you, and you can only achieve this by opposing Napoleon in everything."22 . Some of the researchers believed that Talleyrand thereby made a "reckless bold step" 23 . But there was no particular courage here. There was no doubt that Alexander would be willing to listen to the judgment coming from the still very influential former French minister. Talleyrand later tried to justify his behavior by saying that by betraying Napoleon, he was acting in the interests of France .24 Who could believe that? He was only acting out of self-interest. As for his concept, the growing differences between Napoleon and Talleyrand in foreign policy issues rested primarily in disputes about the union: Talleyrand opposed the union with Austria to the union with Russia, which Napoleon was guided by. His blind hostility to Russia had the reverse side of the main problem.-

19 RIO. Vol. 88, NN 59, 73, 93, 104, 116, 126, 177, 193, 217.

20 Las Cases. Memorial de Sainte Helene. Vol. I. P. 1968, p. 438.

21 A. de Caulaincourt. Memoires. T. 1. P. 1933, p. 273.

22 E. Dard. Op. cit., p. 207; G. Lacour-Gayet. Op. cit. T. II, pp. 246 - 247. It is significant that both historians refer to Metternich's memoirs as the main source for Talleyrand's "work" in Erfurt.

23 A. Vandel. Edict. soch. Vol. I, p. 429.

24 См. "Memoires du prince de Talleyrand". Vol. I. P. 1891, pp. 420 - 450.

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based on historical reminiscences, and not on real facts, blind and unrestrained worship of Austria. From 1807 to 1808. Talleyrand was actually acting as an agent of Austria, and Napoleon's mock-critical remark to Talleyrand - "and you are still the same Austrian" 25-had a deep foundation.

Talleyrand's betrayal had important consequences. Although Alexander viewed the alliance with France much more soberly than he portrayed it to Napoleon, he still believed that in those circumstances, this alliance was in the interests of Russia. Therefore, on his way to Erfurt, the tsar was determined to continue to strengthen it. Talleyrand's treachery and Napoleon's astonishing shortsightedness made quite an impression on Alexander.

If even a man like Talleyrand, who also enjoys the confidence of his emperor, calls for fighting Napoleon, then the affairs of the French Empire are really not brilliant.

On October 12 (September 30), the Union Convention between Russia and France27 was signed . On the basis of mutual concessions, a compromise acceptable to both sides was reached. The preamble to the main text stated: "E. V-vo Emperor of All Russia and E. Vo Emperor of the French, King of Italy, protector of the Rhenish League, desiring to make the union between them closer and more permanent... "and so on. 28." Forever strong..."? These two words were printed on paper, sealed with signatures and seals. But could they be trusted? Comparing the final text of the convention with the original draft and counter-draft versions proves that both sides were looking for mutually acceptable solutions. Consequently, they still considered an alliance of the two Powers necessary. The recognition of this need for an alliance with Russia prompted Napoleon to concede the main question for Alexander about Moldavia and Wallachia, and article 8 of the convention was adopted in the wording that the tsar insisted on .29
Then a message was signed to King George III of England calling for peace. At Napoleon's request, it was agreed that P. A. Tolstoy would be replaced in Paris by another ambassador. Business was over, and the hour of parting had come. Behind them were ostentatious agreement and long bickering. The parting date was unexpectedly friendly. On horseback, Napoleon and Alexander, their retinue trailing at a great distance behind them, rode out of the city, where the tsar's carriages were waiting. They dismounted and walked back and forth for a long time, talking animatedly. The content of their last conversation remained unknown. The tsar and the emperor shook hands firmly, then embraced and kissed each other ... 30 .

Napoleon rode slowly back to Erfurt on horseback. He was thoughtful and didn't talk to anyone.

2. The first setbacks

On October 19, Napoleon returned to Paris. The order of the day was the war in Spain. Troops were being rushed from Germany and Italy to the Spanish border. An additional set of recruits was announced. In a short time, a 150-thousandth army was concentrated beyond the Pyrenees, including the Imperial Guard and other selected units. The Polish division was also sent to strangle the freedom of Spain. What was this war fought for? What was its purpose? A report published in the Moniteur and edited by Napoleon himself declared that this war was being waged "for the safety of France"; it was intended to free Spain from the yoke of "the tyrants of the sea..., the enemies of peace" - England. "English gold, intrigues of agents of the Inquisition..., influence of monks" were declared the main sources of"troubles". But along with these

25 G. Lacour-Gayet. Op. cit. T. II, p. 242.

26 "Russian antiquity", vol. 98, 1899, book IV.

27 Text of the Convention and its original versions: AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery 1808, Erfurt, d. 3251, ll. 2-10; cf. VLOOKUP, vol. IV. M. 1965, pp. 359-363, N 161.

28 VLOOKUP, vol. IV, p. 361.

29 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, 1808, Erfurt, d. 3251, ll. 1-13; see also d. 3250 and VLOOKUP, vol. IV, N 158.

30 "Memoires du due de Rovigo". Vol. IV. p. 6.

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With statements that seemed to evoke the spirit of the proclamations of 1796, the same report also contained direct threats to the "Spanish rabble." 31
In private conversations, Napoleon expressed his thoughts more openly: "We need Spain to become French... It is for the sake of France that I am conquering Spain, " he told Roederer when he offered him the post of Finance minister under King Joseph II . In a message to the Senate, Napoleon wrote:: "I place new sacrifices on my peoples with confidence... They are essential for achieving universal peace... French people, I have no other goals than your happiness and the safety of your children. " 33 But after so many years of war, the words of peace were no longer believed. The people didn't want any more war, they were fed up with it. And even people far removed from politics could not help but wonder why, in order to achieve peace, it is necessary to put the brother of the French emperor on the Spanish throne. Does the safety of French children depend on whether Joseph Bonaparte is King of Naples or King of Spain?

Besides, how did it happen that France was drawn back into the war? After all, a year ago, in 1807, after completing a difficult campaign against the fourth coalition, Napoleon promised that this was the "last war". Tilsit did give him the necessary guarantees, and in the heyday of the Franco-Russian alliance, in the summer and autumn of 1807, most Frenchmen believed that the time for war was over. Nevertheless, just 20 days after the signing of the Tilsit Agreements, on July 29, Napoleon ordered General Junot to lead an army of 20,000 bayonets intended for the invasion of Portugal. Back in Tilsit, Napoleon had argued to Alexander I that Portugal was England's only foothold in Europe and that this must end. The king at that time had more important concerns, and the Portuguese government was ready to make any concessions. But nothing could save him, for nothing satisfied Napoleon . On October 27, the Franco-Spanish treaty on the partition of Portugal was signed at Fontainebleau, 35 and Junot's army was already marching along the roads of the Iberian Peninsula, moving towards Lisbon.

Was the Portuguese expedition a new war? At first, most French people didn't think so. This was one of the measures to implement the continental blockade. How little importance was attached to the "Portuguese cause" can be seen from the fact that while Junot's soldiers were advancing along the rocky roads of Spain, Napoleon left for Italy. There, on November 23, without firing a shot, the Kingdom of Etruria was declared defunct. French troops entered Florence. An old name appeared-Tuscany. It soon became clear that not only the name of the state had changed, but also the dynasty that ruled it. Instead of Marie-Louise of the House of Bourbon, there was also a woman on the throne of Tuscany, but from the Bonaparte dynasty - Elise, Napoleon's sister. Six months later, on May 30, 1808, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany was incorporated into the French Empire with autonomous rights .36
On November 23 and December 17, Napoleon issued decrees in Milan extending the Berlin decrees of 1806: all ships and goods belonging to the British are subject to blockade .37 Pope Pius VII, as a secular sovereign, did not consider himself bound by the decree on the blockade. When Napoleon demanded the termination of all ties with England, the demand was left without consequences. Apparently, the Vatican believed that the emperor, who understood the importance of supporting the Catholic Church, would not risk a quarrel with its head. Those were erroneous calculations. Napoleon raised his voice. The letter accompanying the note to the Pope, dictated by Napoleon, threatened that the emperor would be able to make "the contrast between Jesus Christ" felt.,

31 "Corr.", t. 17, pp. 482 - 486, N 14289.

32 P. L. Roederer. Oeuvres. T. III. P. 1854, p. 536.

33 "Corr.", t. 17, pp. 487 - 488, N 19293.

34 "Corr.", t. 16, N 13340. When Napoleon announced that Portugal had closed its ports to England on October 21, he again reminded Junot that "nothing can stop the movement of troops to Lisbon" (p.147).

35 De Clercq. Op cit. T. II, pp. 235 - 237; L. Picard. Expedition du Portugal (1807). P. 1912; D'Abrantes. Memoires. T. VIII. P. 1833.

36 P. Marmottan. Elisa Bonaparte. P. 1898; S. E. Driault. Napoleon en Italie... P. 1906; E. Rodocanadri. Elisa Napoleon (Bacciocchi) en Italie. P. 1900.

37 De Clercq. Op. cit. T. II, pp. 242 - 244.

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who died on the cross, and his successor, who made himself a king. " 38 In February 1808, General Miollis occupied Rome without firing a shot. In May of the same year, the "eternal city" was incorporated into the French Empire39 .

To repeat the question: was the capture of Tuscany and Rome a new war? Who would dare to say that then?.. After all, the whole operation was carried out "in kid gloves", without a single victim. But people who were inclined to think about the future shrugged their shoulders: why should Rome and Florence be added to France? Do such annexations contribute to the consolidation of peace? Napoleon was already thinking of more. Psychologically, he was probably in the state of a gambler who broke the pot-a big win and decided not to play anymore, not to try his luck. But here he went "with a small card", so just to stretch his fingers - and suddenly again a big win. And, continuing to assure that he has given up all gambling forever, he quietly (one small card, then the second, then the third, and each brings a big jackpot!) he goes straight back into the game. Of course, this comparison is very conditional. After all, the game played by Napoleon was not played on gold-the game was played on human heads.

On November 19, Junot's corps reached the walls of Lisbon. All the members of the royal house of Braganza, abandoning their wealth and country to the mercy of the conquerors, fled to Brazil. Portugal became the prey of the French army. But now that the French flag was flying over Lisbon and Junot was installed in the royal palace as an all-powerful ruler, Bonaparte seemed to have doubts: why fulfill the obligations of the treaty of Fontainebleau? Why share Portugal with someone? The logic of such reasoning led to further: Instead of sharing Portugal with Spain, wouldn't it be easier to deal with Spain itself as with Portugal? This was the logic of an unpunished aggressor, a conqueror who had so far met no resistance in his path.

However, as is evident from Napoleon's letters and orders, which were extremely contradictory and sometimes even mutually exclusive, 40 the emperor hesitated for a long time before deciding to take this step. Spain is not Tuscany or Portugal. And in general, in the representation of political figures of the early XIX century. Spain was still a great Power 41 . In addition, it was for many years an ally of Napoleonic France. In short, it was not easy to take the throne from the Spanish king and swallow Spain. Napoleon's task was unexpectedly made easier by the fact that in Spain there was an extremely acute conflict between the king and the crown prince, complicated by the excessively increased role of the queen's favorite, the "prince of peace" Godoy. The Spanish Bourbons had already reached an extreme degree of degeneracy, and the cruel brush of Fr. Goya has shown this with more conviction than any historical work. However, all the members of the Spanish royal family who argued among themselves turned to the powerful French emperor for support. By the very course of things, he became an arbiter in the decision of Spanish courts.

After some hesitation, Napoleon decided, and having made up his mind, he tried to carry out the plan he had conceived. First of all, it was important for him to gain the full confidence of the king, the heir to the throne, Godoy, the queen - and then deceive everyone. He took on the role of an uninterested senior (not in years, but in position) monarch who cares about the honor and dignity of his "brothers on the throne". When he received a letter from Prince Ferdinand asking Napoleon to recognize him as king and informing him of his intention to start a trial against Godoy, Napoleon immediately replied to him subtly and evasively: a trial against Godoy should not be started. "Your Royal Highness has no other rights than those of your mother. If the trial disgraces her, Your Highness will be destroying her own rights. " 42 Joseph de Maistre, who, in his frequent appeals to God, was a true believer, was a true believer.

38 " Corr.", t. 16, N 13477, p. 265.

39 Ibid., NN 13536, 13555, 13572.

40 See " Corr.", t. 16, NN 13406, 13412, 13413, 13916, 13929. 13943, 13446, 13495, 13578, 13588, 13589, 13608, 13624.

41 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chancellery, 1808, 7513. Reports of the envoy of Baron Stroganov.

42 "Corr.", t. 17, N 13750, p. 10.

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a fiend of hell, he remarked when he learned of this letter: "I don't think Louis XIV could have written better... The place referring to the queen is written... by the claws of Satan " 43 .

The carefully thought-out and expertly executed game was nearing completion. Napoleon succeeded in luring the king, Queen, Ferdinand, and Godoy into a trap. They all came to Bayonne at different times, but of their own free will .44 The emperor remained a "benevolent judge", alien to personal preferences. He listened carefully to everyone, didn't rush anyone, and didn't show the slightest sign of personal interest for a second. Only one phrase in the letter to Talleyrand revealed his intentions: "The Spanish tragedy, if I am not mistaken, has entered its fifth act; the denouement is approaching." 45 It came on May 10, in full accordance with the laws of stage acting, as the natural conclusion of all the previous ones, when Charles IV and Ferdinand gave up their rights to the throne in favor of the French emperor. Napoleon completed the role. He hesitated, maybe even hesitated. It was still about a month before Joseph Bonaparte was formally proclaimed King of Spain on June 6, 1808.

Probably, in terms of the skill of directing and the subtlety of the role played by him, the Bayonne comedy or tragedy (it was both) was Bonaparte's highest achievement. He carried out the whole operation of stealing the throne from father and son at once really masterfully, without taking off his gloves. Not a single shot, not a single harsh gesture, not a single harsh word, and Spain was "conquered". He could be triumphant. Three capitals, three most famous cities in the world: Florence, Rome and Madrid - recognized the primacy of the French imperial crown.

But his triumph was short-lived. Bayonne, which Napoleon saw as a remarkable diplomatic victory, a kind of political Austerlitz, was in fact the biggest blunder in his strategic plans. Woe to the strategist who has forgotten how to distinguish between losing and winning! Bayonne showed that Bonaparte, blinded by the excitement of easy victories, lost the ability to make sober assessments necessary for a commander .46 The theft of the throne from the Spanish Bourbons in favor of the brother of the French emperor made all the surviving monarchs of the old dynasties suspect that one of them would be next. Napoleon at that time was persistently credited with the words: "Soon the Bonaparts will become the oldest dynasty in Europe." This aphorism could only be understood in the sense that the other dynasties-the Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns, etc. - would have to disappear. The Habsburgs believed that after Bayonne, the danger came very close to them. At Bayonne, the seeds of a future war with Austria were laid; it accelerated the formation of a fifth coalition.

However, retribution came even faster and from the direction from which Bonaparte least expected. In such a successful game, in his opinion, a force intervened, which he did not take into account. The people of Spain, immediately understanding the true meaning of the French intervention, responded to it with an armed uprising. As early as the end of February 1808, Stroganov reported from Madrid that, according to his observations, the discontent of the Spaniards with French soldiers was increasing .47 Since then, not a week has passed without a tsarist diplomat signaling the growing symptoms in Madrid .48 On May 2, an uprising broke out. Murat suppressed it with buckshot, but, having restored Porya-

43 Cit. by: A. Sorel. L'Europe et la Revolution francaise. P. 1904. T. VII, p. 218.

44 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chancellery, 1808, 7513. Stroganov, in a report dated March 30 (April 11 A.D.), reported that Prince Ferdinand had left for Bayonne with the brightest hopes (ll. 150-155). At the same time that Napoleon was writing friendly letters to Ferdinand, he instructed Savary to lure him to Bayonne, and Bessieres warned that if he refused to go, he should immediately be arrested ("Corr.", t. 17, NN 13749, 13751, 13756).

45 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chancellery, 1808, 7513, ll. 267 - 270, 283 - 296, 393 - 398; "" Corr.", t. 17, N 13778, p. 39; E. Ducere. Napoleon a Bayonne. D'apres les contemporaines et des documents inedits. Bayonne. 1897; P. Conard. La Constitution de Bayonne, 1808. P. 1910; A. Fugier. Napoleon et l'Espagne... Vol. 2. P. 1930.

46 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, 1808, Madrid, 7413. In Stroganov's papers is an extensive manuscript "On the theft of the Spanish throne", showing how great was the indignation of the Spanish people after Bayonne.

47 Ibid., l. 44, 27 February (10 March).

48 Ibid., pp. 62-67, 68-84. Stroganov's reports of March 5(17) and 10(22).

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the doc in the capital mistakenly concluded that "the mutiny has been eliminated" 49 . In the next few days, Seville, Grenada, Zaragoza, and Valencia were seized by the uprising. It moved from province to province at an astonishing rate and quickly became popular.

Napoleon was unpleasantly surprised, but not disturbed, by the news from Spain. Ever since he became a monarch and built his politics as a chain of different combinations with monarchs, he treated the people with disdain. He ordered General Dupont, whose military talents he highly valued, 50 to move south to Seville. At the same time, the corps of General Moncey was sent to Valencia, and the corps of Marshal Bessieres paved the way for Joseph to Madrid. On July 14, Bessier defeated two combined Spanish armies at the Battle of Medina del Rio Seno. On the 20th of July, Joseph entered Madrid in state and graciously received the Spanish grandees, who greeted him grandly with elegant Castilian greetings .51 The Spanish chapter of the story was coming to an end. Everything, it seemed to Napoleon, was going as it should. Napoleon left Bayonne. He made a leisurely tour of the empire to see how his subjects lived under his scepter. He was greeted everywhere with admiration and fear.

Suddenly, in Bordeaux, he received a report of the surrender of Dupont's army at Bailen on July 23. Pierre Dupont de Lethan, one of his best fighting generals, considered the first candidate for the marshal's baton, allowed the partisan detachments and regiments of General Castagnos to surround his division, and after unsuccessful and uncertain maneuvers, without exhausting all possibilities, capitulated in an open field .52 The Spaniards captured about 18 thousand French. Only generals and senior officers were granted the right to return to their homeland. Most of the soldiers died in captivity. Stroganov supplemented the report on the Baylen disaster with significant details: Dupont was saddled with a loot estimated at 150 million reais .53
The Bailen disaster was not only a disgrace to the empire ("he disgraced our banners, he disgraced the army ," Napoleon repeated many times.; "I have an indelible stain here," he would say, pointing to his field coat on his chest.) The true meaning of the Bailen Surrender was, of course, not that. The news of Bailen rose above the dark skies of Europe like a red signal flare announcing that the hour of liberation had arrived. Bailen proved that Napoleon's army was no longer invincible. She surrenders to the brave. Bailen increased the strength of the Spanish national liberation movement tenfold. Spain, after Bailen, could neither be conquered nor conquered. Napoleon still waged war against armies. In Spain, he was now to wage war against the rebellious people. The news of Bailen also emboldened the Portuguese. Two weeks after Dupont's surrender, the whole of Portugal was in revolt. On August 6, British troops landed in Portugal under the command of Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington. Junot, with his small and half-decayed army, was powerless to overcome the increasing danger. On August 30, he signed the act of surrender in Sintra, consoling himself with the fact that he was not the first and that the British had conscientiously brought the surrendered French back to their homeland. But what difference could it have made? Sintra added Bylen. Two capitulations of the Imperial army in two months. Was there any doubt about the significance of these events?

Back in 1807, after Tilsit, when Napoleon returned to Paris at the height of his glory, he took measures to permanently, as he hoped, put an end to all opposition within the country. At a time of universal enthusiasm for the victories of the empire and the hopes for the future

49 Ibid., ll. 235, 267-270: April 30 (May 12).

50 See M. Leproux. Le Genera! Dupont. P. 1939.

51 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, 1808, Madrid, 7516.

52 E. Cabany. La Capitulation de Baylen. P. 1902; A. Grasset. La Guerre d'Espagne. Vol. I. P. 1914; L. Larehey. Les Suites d'une capitulation. P. 1884; P. Betzger. La Capitulation de Baylen. P. 1909; E. Titeux. Le General Dupont et la capitulation de Baylen. Vol. 1 - 3. Puteaux- sur-Seine. 1903 (this old work is not without interest as an attempt to justify Dupont).

53 AVPR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chancellery, 1808, Madrid, 7513, ll. 456-457. Stroganov-Rumyantsev, July 28 (August 9).

54 "Lettres inedites de Napoleon I". T. I, NN 333, 336, 341, 342.

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the world found this easier than ever. He began by saying that the "crow that brings trouble" Germaine de Stael had become so emboldened that she had returned to Paris on her own accord and was receiving guests in her house - all the colors of the opposition, who were ready to discuss the likely disastrous consequences of the Battle of Preussisch-Eylau with feigned sympathy that did not hide their enthusiasm. Her conceit was boundless. It was reported that she once asked Talleyrand: "Do you think the Emperor is as clever as I am?" "Madame,"replied the Prince of Benevento," I think he is not so bold." Her ego told her that she should be the leader of the liberal party. The colossal fortune she had inherited from her father, her literary talent, and her penchant for intrigue - the combination of these three elements made the flighty woman truly a bit of a force. Napoleon ordered her expelled from Paris. The "first beauty of Europe" Juliette Recamier, who was friends with Me, allowed herself a cheeky remark: "You can excuse men for some of their weaknesses, for example, when they are very fond of women. But when they're afraid of them, they can't be forgiven." The words reached Napoleon. According to the current version, he answered simply: "I don't think Madame de Stael is a woman." With Madame Recamier, he did not see the possibility of war, although he knew that in her salon there were free conversations. He was also sure that he was most aware of all Fouche's suspicious whispers. "Intrigue," Napoleon later said, " is as necessary to Fouche as food. He intrigued at all times, in all places, in all ways, and with everyone. His obsession was to poke his nose everywhere. " 55 Fouche was closely watched: Savary on top, Dubois, Prefect of the Paris police, on the bottom. But even under the overlapping beams of double surveillance, Fouche remained elusive, even though Napoleon was inwardly convinced that Fouche was not loyal to him. There was also evidence (obtained by Dubois, who hated his superior) that Fouche was in touch with the Royalists in London, almost with Foch-Borel, the Count of Lille's chief agent. But Fouche managed to get away with it, 56 and Napoleon retained the Ministry of Police for him. Fouche's talent for penetrating silently through an impenetrable wall or keyhole was almost unique. Such a person could not simply be parted from: he had to be either preserved or destroyed. Napoleon believed that Fouche's time had not yet come. Events showed that he was wrong.

Nevertheless, all this talk of discontent, reported very carefully by the police reports 57, irritated him. By decree of August 19, 1807, the Tribunate was abolished. The role of this representative institution, as well as others, has long been reduced to a purely decorative one. But Napoleon wanted to show that he was not afraid to remove the scenery. Let the stage be empty. He can stay on it all alone, he does not need the scenery. The dissolution of the Tribunate had no direct practical consequences in view of the complete helplessness of this institution. Whether there was a Tribunate or not, nothing in the empire changed. It was a deterrent measure, and that was how it was understood. The time of the republic has passed. The empire is ruled by an emperor. Now there is no need for a tribune, tribunes, or Tribunate. There is only one opinion and one will - the emperor, and his will is the law.

And yet, a year later, he saw that the seeds of discontent were once again rising from all sides. In 1808, the opposition was stronger than the previous year. In a narrow circle, protected from the all-pervading eyes and ears of the police, the Emperor's policies were more sharply and openly condemned. Denis Decret, the perpetual Minister of the Sea, a friend of Captain Buonaparte in his youth, then holding his hands at his sides before him, who in 1808 received the title of count, and later-duke, told people he trusted that Napoleon "went mad, completely mad. He will perish himself and destroy us all. " 58 His own brother, Joseph, King of Spain, for whose sake this war was being waged, surrounded himself during his brief stay in Madrid with men who were known for their fronde against Bonaparte, and told his entourage that it was his duty to protect his new subjects from the tyranny of Napo-

55 Las Cases. Memorial... T. I, p. 502.

56 L. Madelin. Fouche. T. II, pp. 29 - 33.

57 E. Hauterive. La Police secrete du Premier Empire. T. III. P. 1907.

58 J. Lefebvre. Napoleon. P. 1953.

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leona 59 . Caulaincourt, in a confidential conversation at Erfurt, plucked up the courage to say that the emperor's chosen system of action, his policy in Germany and in Spain, inspired everyone with fear; everyone felt threatened. "What are the plans attributed to me?" Napoleon asked. "Rule alone." Napoleon tried to justify his actions, mentioning unforeseen circumstances, the machinations of some people and the incompetence of others .60
In France, there were people who believed that you should not stop at half measures and limit yourself to behind-the-scenes criticism. In the summer of 1808, Generals Malet, Nyunet, and Dutaert and several officers were arrested." They were charged with preparing an anti-government plot to restore the republic. Apparently, others were involved in the plot. Napoleon gave Fouche a directive not to make the case public .61 He didn't want to give anyone a reason to question his popularity in the empire. Whether Fouche, taking advantage of these directives, did not want to find out the whole matter completely, or whether the plot was not yet fully matured, but the matter was muted, although it inspired Napoleon with considerable misgivings. He suspected the involvement of many Republican figures, 62 and was sure that "anarchists"were involved. In the end, Malet was declared insane. In a letter dated 29 June, Napoleon wrote: "It is impossible to be more dissatisfied with the behavior of the Minister of Police." 63 He demanded that Fouche be watched. "Is this madness or ridicule on the part of this minister? "What is it?" he asked two weeks later. "Explain to me Fouche's role in all this." Has he gone mad? What does he strive for? " 64 . Nevertheless, in spite of his extreme irritation with Fouche and well-founded suspicions against him, Napoleon retained him in his former post.

Bonaparte saw terrible symptoms of public discontent, manifested in one or the other. The frontiers of Decret, the grumblings of Joseph, the objections of Caulaincourt, the secret intrigues of Fouche, the Republican conspiracy-were they not all links in the same chain? The emperor would not admit it, even in private. It seemed to him that all the people worshipped him, that his power was boundless, that if he only frowned, his enemies would be instantly defeated. It was at a time when the crisis of the Napoleonic regime was growing that the emperor became more confident that everything was allowed to him, that he could achieve anything he wanted, that everything and everything was subject to his will. When in Spain, during incredibly difficult marches through icy mountain ranges defended by desperately brave Spanish patriots, one of the officers, in response to an order given to him about an impossible operation, exclaimed: "This is impossible!" - Napoleon replied coldly and with conviction:"This word does not exist for me; I do not know it". Since then, he has repeatedly repeated this favorite aphorism of his own and supplemented it: "There is no need for "ifs" or "buts"; you need to achieve success, and that's all."

It was an ever-increasing self-blindness. He persuaded others and was imbued with faith in the irresistible power of the will and his own omnipotence. This was the logical conclusion of the entire previous life's journey: first, severe disappointments, loss of faith, then an amazing chain of almost phantasmagoric successes and on this basis spiritual savagery. A. S. Pushkin, with his amazing gift of generalizations, was able, perhaps, to reduce all this complex and multi-sided complex of contradictions to two lines that amaze with depth of thought: "You autocracy was captivated by its disillusioned beauty. " 65
59 L. Madelin. Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire. T. 7. P. 1949, p. 228.

60 A. de Caul aincourt. Op. cit. T. I, pp. 247 - 249.

61 "Lettres inedites...". T. I, N 289; B. Melchior-Bounet. La Conspiration du general Malet. P. 1963; H. Gaulert. Conspirateurs au temps de Napoleon I. P. 1962.

62 "Lettres inedites...". T. I, NN 290, 292, 295, 297.

63 Ibid., N 310, p. 212.

64 Ibid., N 315.

65 A. S. Pushkin. Complete Works, vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 63.

(The ending follows.)

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