rently so caught up in this absurd idea that he overlooked the British landing force under Wellesley that occupied Lisbon. Now I had to think not about the Portuguese crown, but about saving my army. He failed to hold his ground. He had to retreat under the onslaught of the British. The retreat of Soult led to the withdrawal of Marshal Ney from Galicia. The illustrious Marshal was also more interested in the ongoing hostility to Soult than in the immediate tasks of fighting the enemy. 24
The defeat at Esling, the setbacks in Spain, the awakening of the national-patriotic movement in occupied Germany - isn't this the beginning of the end? This question has been asked by many, especially by opponents of the empire. Napoleon was aware that all hostile forces were raising their heads. But in the hour of danger, he kept his cool. His main efforts were aimed at ensuring a decisive turning point in the course of the war. Was the enemy stronger than they were in previous campaigns? So, we need to better prepare for the upcoming battle. Although Lobau Island was not considered by many to be an ideal springboard for launching offensive operations, Napoleon, for political reasons, which he never separated from purely military ones, did not consider it possible to leave it. The island would have been immediately occupied by the Austrians. Public opinion would see this as a major victory for Austria. Consequently, it was necessary first to cling to the island, then to build several solid, solid bridges that could withstand any tests, and finally to accumulate the right amount of offensive forces. Disguised in the uniform of a sergeant, so that he could not be recognized, Napoleon and his retinue in soldiers ' uniforms, from one end of the island to the other, watched and checked how the bridges were being built, how the fortifications were being built, what the mood of the soldiers was.

He was playing a game of aggravation. He resolved the growing disagreements with the Pope in a radical way. On May 17, 1809, the pope was stripped of his temporal power, and the papal possessions were annexed to France. No one had expected the Emperor to be so bold, which seemed sacrilegious to many. The "Holy Father" refused to accept the arbitrary rule of the self-willed monarch whom he had crowned Emperor of the French five years before. Correcting his "previous mistakes", he condemned the impious emperor, who encroached on the sacred rights of the Vatican. The whole of Europe watched with bated breath the struggle between Napoleon and the Pope. Who will prevail? On July 5-6, 1809, French soldiers entered the sacred chambers of the head of the Catholic Church and took Pius VII out of Rome .25 Not expecting such "blasphemous" audacity, the Pope published a bull excommunicating Napoleon from the church.

First of all, the date of this bold act draws attention to itself. On June 19, four weeks after Essling, Napoleon instructed Murat to arrest the Pope if he resisted. Pius VII was arrested and made a prisoner of the emperor on the day of the battle of Wagram, when the outcome of the battle was still unknown. Napoleon would like to say: let no one think that the emperor of the French is frightened and has become more compliant. On the contrary, he will show everyone that there is still gunpowder in the flasks 26 . To the people of the early nineteenth century, when the power of the church was still very great, the bold actions of Napoleon, who was not afraid to almost put the "holy father" in the brig, seemed to shake all the foundations, sacrilege, blasphemy. Not only Catholics, but all supporters of the church and order were outraged. Napoleon was once again about to be declared a " fiend of the revolution." People of the left could not,

23 See " Corr.", t. 19, N 15871, pp. 527-528.

24 Grandmaison. L'Espagne et Napoleon. T. II. P. 1908, pp. 129 - 153.

25 See H. Chotard. Pie VII a Savone. P. 1887; A. Latreille. Napoleon et le Saint- Siege. P. 1935; M. de Lupe. La Capitivite de Pie VII. P. 1912.

26 "Corr.", t. 19, NN 15383. 15384.

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naturally, they objected to this act, but they did not understand the logic of his actions. Why conclude a concordat in order to enter into open conflict with the Catholic Church in five years? It was a bold move, but was it consistent and logical? The transformation of Rome into "an imperial and free city, the second city of the empire"was also embarrassing. You could think of the Pope and the Catholic Church as you liked, but with the most fervent imagination, the eternal city could not be considered one of the French ones.

Napoleon kept a sharp eye on what was being done both in the vassal kingdoms and in the mother country. Three of his brothers sat on thrones; two of his sisters were sovereigns; the whole of Western Europe was already under the rule of the Bonaparte clan, or the Bonaparte dynasty, as the emperor now preferred to call it. But what's the use of that? Three brothers are three kings, and there is no help from anywhere, and it is not his brothers who help him, but he must help them. And so from Schoenbrunn to Madrid, to Amsterdam, to Kassel, couriers rush with harsh letters of condemnation of the brother kings .27 From far away Vienna, Napoleon keeps an eye on Fouche. This shifty police minister seems more and more suspicious to him every day. The emperor sends him harsh letters, lectures him, and reprimands him 28 . "Napoleon is not dead yet" - let everyone remember this!

5. The Austrian marriage

On July 5-6, 1809, the battle for which Napoleon had been preparing for two months finally took place: the Battle of Wagram. The battle was extremely fierce, with heavy losses on both sides. Wagram ended with the victory of the French weapons. The Austrian army had to retreat. From the point of view of military art, Wagram was prepared and conducted well by Napoleon. During the battle, he applied a novelty-a battering ram strike: three divisions under the command of MacDonald were moved in closed ranks to break through the enemy center. They actually managed to break through the enemy's front, and this breakthrough was crucial for the outcome of the battle. When Davout simultaneously began to outflank the enemy, Archduke Charles, fearing the worst, ordered a retreat. Still, Wagram was nothing like Austerlitz, much less Jena. The Austrian army was neither destroyed nor crushed. She retreated in perfect order and would probably be able to engage in a battle of the same magnitude again in a short time. Napoleon, on the other hand, already felt that the victory had been won at the cost of a great exertion of strength, and that it would be extremely difficult for him to go to another battle as fierce as Wagram.

The Emperor celebrated his victory noisily. Berthier was given the title of Prince of Wagram, Davout the title of Prince of Eckmuhl, and Massen the somewhat ambiguous title of Prince of Esling. MacDonald, Marmont, and Oudinot were promoted to marshals. All three of them were highly experienced battle generals, but the army asked in low voices: can three new marshals replace one dead Lann? There was another question behind it: did Wagram's gold-and-bronze glory weigh more than the easy, unadorned victory at Montenotto? Moreover, as soon as Napoleon won the victory at Wagram, he had to prepare for new battles. Was he still as sure that he was going to get a lucky star as before?

He was obviously lucky: the Archduke Charles, who was not distinguished for his outstanding military abilities by firmness of character and belligerent fervor, was also inclined to end the war .29 On July 12, at Znaim, he offered to conclude an armistice, and Napoleon immediately accepted the offer. The armistice was followed by peace negotiations, which ended on October 14 with the signing of the Treaty of Schoenbrunn. Austria lost its southwestern and eastern provinces, had to pay an indemnity of 85 million, and pledged to reduce its army to 150,000 men .30
27 "Corr.", t. 18, NN 15192, 15193, 15201; "Lettres inedites...". Vol. 1, NN 451, 452, 457, 461, 464, 478, 479, 485, 504, 507, 527.

28 Ibid., No. 448 (20. V. 1809: a sharp reprimand: he "is engaged in chatter about foreign policy, and not in his duties"), No. 486 (26.VII: "we must tell the truth - the police cannot read"), etc.

29 O. Criste. Erzherzog Karl. Bd. I - III. Wien-Leipzig. 1912.

30 "Recueil des Traites de la France". Ed. par de Clercq. T. II. P. 1880, pp. 293 - 299.

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Napoleon emerged victorious from a war that threatened him with incalculable dangers. Champagny, the Foreign Minister, sent out triumphant messages to all parts of the world: the Empire had once again proved its invincible power, and the Emperor his military genius; who would dare to resist them now? But people who saw the emperor more closely said that they had never seen him so focused, frowning and gloomy as during his days in the Schonbrunn Palace. It was reported that he was ill with something, subject to some attacks. The emperor's bad mood was most often attributed to Lann's death. Napoleon was shocked by his death, there is no denying that. Lann was the one he valued most, and he was the only one who would tell him the truth. A version was spread that the dying Lannes, whom Napoleon visited twice-in the morning and in the evening-expressed a number of bitter truths and sharply accused Bonaparte. Napoleon himself later described in his memoirs how Lannes, having lost both his legs and felt that his life was leaving him, was angry, cursed and clung to Napoleon: he hoped with his help to stop the impending death .31 Such things were hard to come up with; it was probably true. But it is possible that this was only part of the truth, and the other, difficult and difficult for Napoleon, the latter did not tell. Recent researchers tend to accept the old version of Lann's bitter words as true .32
However, however much the death of France may have meant to Napoleon, it alone cannot explain his painful condition. He was a soldier, had seen death up close and often. He had already experienced the death of Muiron, Desaix, and many people close to him. The reason for his ill-humor lay deeper: he could not help but feel the shifting ground on which the empire's seemingly monumental and solid edifice stood. Napoleon was a man of action and could not allow himself to indulge in thoughts, even if sad and critical. It was necessary to immediately realize the advantages of the victory over Austria. Continuing to follow the same path of aggression, which led him from one mistake to another, Napoleon hurried to complete the victorious peace with a political marriage. He naively believed that by becoming related to one of the reigning houses of the great powers of Europe, he would thereby strengthen his own dynasty. This "dynastic madness" (to repeat the expression of Karl Marx once again) led him so far that, having stumbled upon the actual refusal of Tsar Alexander I to marry his sister to him, 33 he decided to marry the daughter of the Austrian emperor , against whom he had waged war four times over the course of 13 years. In Vienna, the first hints of matrimonial relations were received with the greatest alacrity. The House of Habsburg, which had a wealth of experience in unprincipled transactions in any field, and especially in terms of dynastic marriage combinations, considered the matchmaking of the winner as a happy find. Everyone from Metternich to Talleyrand, who was paid for by the Austrians, suddenly discovered an amazing efficiency that had never been shown before under any other circumstances. Maria Luisa, whose opinion was least taken into account, from Metternich's point of view, became the main trump card in the anti-Russian game. It was Metternich's obsession to destroy the Franco-Russian alliance and eliminate the Tilsit affair. The marriage contract between the Habsburgs and Bonaparts turned out to be a "gift from God"for him. No one has been more diligent in this matter than the Austrian minister.

Napoleon, in his progressive blindness, willingly, even eagerly, went into the nets that had been set for him. To marry Marie-Louise, he had to overcome many obstacles. Probably the most difficult one (psychologically) was breaking up with Josephine. This woman he continued to love, of course, in a different way than in 1796, but, in fact, she remained the only woman he loved. Besides, as a superstitious Corsican with all his atavistic superstitions and beliefs in omens, he secretly believed that it was she who brought him happiness. His good fortune only began to accompany him from the day when he joined his fate with the life of the general's widow

31 Las Cases. Memorial de Sainte-Helene. T. II. P. 1968, pp. 24 - 25.

32 A. Castelot. Napoleon. P. 1968, pp. 297 - 299.

33 When Alexander answered back in Erfurt that the marriage question was not up to him, he was telling the truth. With the bad attitude of his mother Maria Feodorovna, and the entire Russian noble society to Napoleon, such a marriage of his sister was virtually impossible.

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Beauharnais. The same woman who brought misfortune to Alexandre Beauharnais, brought him good luck. This was "proven" by many years of experience, thirteen years of living together. With all her faults-her extravagance, her ridiculous secret expenses, her tendency to deny everything and always find the same word "no" in answer to all questions - this already fading Creole woman was infinitely dear to him. It was hard for him to bear her absence. When he left, he immediately felt the need to write short notes to her (not much more than that, but mentally communicating with her calmed him down). When someone came from Paris and talked about something, Napoleon immediately interrupted: "What does the Empress say?"

Josephine had already known for the past two or three years that things were going to break up, and yet the crucial explanation was very difficult for both of them. Napoleon had to overcome many formal obstacles. To carry out the legal act of divorce, he had to violate the constitutional laws, which he himself established, and the church laws. But he considered marriage to a princess from the house of Habsburg to be the salvation of his dynasty and, breaking the laws, in a short time got Josephine's consent. She retained the title of Empress. She was given the Malmaison Palace. So, two empresses, not counting the empress mother; is this possible? Napoleon has long made it clear that the word "impossible" does not exist for him...

On April 1, 1810, a wedding was solemnized in Saint-Cloud. On the 2nd, a church wedding was held in the Louvre. Napoleon deliberately chose the Louvre over Notre-Dame Cathedral: he wanted to avoid following the motorcade through the entire city. Great celebrations were held in Paris and throughout the empire. But neither the people, nor the army, nor even the ruling elite, obedient to him in everything, approved of this marriage. The observant and intelligent Thibodeau, who was present at the celebration in Saint-Cloud and was standing next to Massena, who also made no secret of his critical attitude towards the marriage with an Austrian woman, remarked that the wedding ceremony "was cold and sad, as if it were a funeral." 34 The empress, the rightful ruler of the Tuileries, Saint-Cloud, Fontainebleau was again an "Austrian", the daughter of Emperor Franz, a princess from the house of Habsburg. Was Marie Antoinette executed in order that in fifteen years her niece, who bore almost the same name, might ascend to the French throne? There was something offensive about this marriage to the French nation. It was seen as an open abuse of the graves of the heroes of Valmy, Marengo, and Austerlitz, and moreover, an indirect rehabilitation of the "old regime". None of Napoleon's political acts was as unpopular as this seemingly purely personal affair: one wife was replaced by another.

The "Austrian marriage" had other consequences: it accelerated and deepened the confusion in the ruling circles of the empire. The new court of Empress Marie-Louise, formed mainly from the "old nobility", came into conflict with the new, imperial nobility. The large Bonaparte clan, which had already acquired its own "small courts" and political clientele, was also now in opposition. The Bonaparts lost, especially after the birth of Napoleon's son in March 1811, who received the title of "king of Rome", all hopes for the French throne. They had to make room and give up the first place to the new, Habsburg relatives of the emperor .35 The circles associated with Josephine were also, of course, against the "Austrian marriage". Finally, it was condemned, for obvious reasons, by the entire generation that went through the revolution and twenty years of anti-Austrian politics.

Politically, the "Austrian marriage" did not and could not give the advantages that Napoleon hoped for. It did not strengthen the prestige of the dynasty either inside or outside the country. It seems that personally, at least for the first time, Napoleon was absorbed in a new situation that changed a lot in his life. Perhaps, having married an eighteen-year-old girl, Napoleon, who was beginning to grow old, felt somewhat rejuvenated? But it didn't last long. The woman who had become his wife without her consent remained essentially a stranger to him. Her subsequent indifference to the fall of the emperor and her infidelity with some insignificant Neyperg were certainly not accidental. It was a natural extension of a marriage of convenience. After noisily coped-

34 A. G. Thibaudeau. Memoires, p. 278.

35 See De Pontecoulant. Souvenirs... T. III, pp. 124 - 125.

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after the wedding, and even after the happy fatherhood, Napoleon felt even more alone than before. Who could he trust? To whom could he speak frankly? In fact, the huge attention paid by foreign historiography to the Austrian marriage of Napoleon 36 is not justified. This marriage was only one of many mistakes made by Napoleon, nothing more than a special case in his general erroneous policy.

6. Before the decisive clash

When some of the major historians, such as Louis Madeleine, call the years 1809-1810 the apogee of the Empire 37 , the question arises: what apogee could we be talking about? From 1808, with the first territorial acquisitions and the first shots fired by the Spanish adventure, the crisis of the empire was already progressing. The attempt to subjugate most of Europe to French domination, with its old, long-established countries and the new, irresistible process of forming unified national states, was a chimera, an adventure that was inevitably doomed to defeat. This policy also meant that war was transformed from a temporary emergency measure into a permanent institution of the imperial regime. The material resources and physical strength of France could not withstand such a strain. It became unbearable for all classes of society. Finally, even the private task of trying to strangle England with a continental blockade also proved too much for France. Although the weakening of English competition in European markets stimulated the development of French industry, the latter was not able to meet the needs of Europe, or even its own. The economic crisis of 1811 is far from accidental. This is a natural result of the general overstrain of the French economy. At the same time, it was becoming increasingly clear that England had not been brought to its knees.

The formation of the Fouche - Talleyrand opposition complot in 1808 was not only an expression of their personal dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the regime, which until then they had zealously supported. It had a deeper meaning. In the person of Fouche and Talleyrand, in the person of the millionaire Ouvrard, who was arrested in 1808, the Brumerian bourgeoisie, which had previously been the mainstay of the empire, passed into opposition to the Bonapartist regime. She accepted the loss of all political rights, and was willing to submit to the emperor's hard hand as long as his power protected her interests and provided guarantees for the future. Adventurism, the politics of chimeras, which became inseparable from the name of Napoleon, contradicted the practical common sense of the bourgeoisie. Sober calculations showed that sooner or later the business would end in failure. The wars sucked the entire young male generation out of the villages. As long as it lasted a year, two, three and was accompanied by brilliant victories, they put up with it. When the recruitment of new recruits, which became more and more rigid from year to year, turned into a system where the army only absorbed, but no one returned, the peasantry began to grumble. In sum, these phenomena meant that the empire was gradually losing its social support. It was a slow, hidden process, almost imperceptible to the eye. Outwardly, it might even seem, and many were misled by this, that the empire was more powerful than ever before.

France's possessions have reached unprecedented proportions. Imperial eagles soared over the vast expanses from the Ebro to the Elbe. The French banner hung over the defeated states of Western and Central Europe. From the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean on the borders of a vast empire, sentries called to each other: "Who's coming?" - "France". France ruled over the defeated part of Europe. But behind the outward submissiveness of the bowed heads, there was an elusive, secret spirit of indignation. It couldn't be measured or calculated. It was an invisible and intangible powerful force, before which officials, police, and the army succumbed. The rebellious spirit of the Italians-

36 See F. Masson. L'Imperatrice Marie-Louise. P. 1902; ejusd. Napoleon et son fils. P. 1922; ejusd. Napoleon et sa famille. Tt. IX, X, XI; de Bourgoing. Marie-Louise, Imperatrice des Francais. P. 1938; E. Driault. Le Roi de Rome. P. 1932.

37 L. Madelin. L'Apogee de l'Empire. T. 8. P. 1945; ejusd. La Crise de l'Empire. T. 9. P. 1945.

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The German "Tugendbund" and the Spanish Guerilla made their way through police cordons and striped border posts. The peoples of Europe were preparing for the great hour of liberation.

But Napoleon did not seem to notice, did not see what was happening around him. The Imperial court at the Tuileries - golden bees on purple velvet-eclipsed all the courts of ancient monarchies in wealth and luxury. Isolated, isolated, surrounded by a crowd of wordless servants - ministers, dignitaries, and generals who were used to following orders and saying only two words: "Yes, sire" - Napoleon, this ruler of the empire, was more alone than ever. He still worked from 6 a.m. until late at night, delving into all the issues, big and small, related to the activities of the vast state machinery, and holding the levers of political and state leadership in his hands. He read reports from all over the vast empire and from the vassal states. He received high dignitaries, ministers, army commanders, and foreign ambassadors. He dictated orders, orders, diplomatic notes, letters to brother kings and European monarchs. Completely absorbed in this manifold task, which seemed too much for one man, he lived in the illusion that all the levers obediently obeyed the slightest movement of his hand and that he controlled the course of events, people and time.

The immense power that was concentrated in the hands of one man, that stretched out over the vast expanses of conquered and conquered countries, the fear that his name inspired, surrounded by the halo of fifteen years of victories, gave him an arrogant self-confidence: nothing is impossible, nothing is insurmountable.

And in 1811, after so many wars, after so many sacrifices, war was again put on the order of the day, this time against the most powerful and formidable power, the ally of France - against Russia. From the beginning of his state activity, from his first steps as head of state, that is, from 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte sought an alliance with Russia. The path to the Russian Union was not easy and difficult. But in June 1807, in Tilsit, this union was found. France and Russia became allies, and Napoleon later admitted that the days of Tilsit were the happiest of his life. However, some time after the happy days of Tilsit, he began to prepare for war against Russia.

Was this war a necessity for the French? Did it meet at least a small measure of the state interests of France? Of course, there was no shortage of controversial issues, private conflicts of interest, or mutual claims. But no matter how many of them there were, they could not justify an armed clash between the two great powers of Europe. Napoleon himself hesitated during the night hours of reflection. The trip to Russia terrified him. He now studied books about Charles XII with particular attention: Poltava, the fate of the Swedish king did not leave his mind. And yet, despite his doubts and hesitations, the logic of unrestrained aggression, the desire for unlimited domination, pushed him to war with the power that he had always dreamed of having as an ally. Even now, especially in correspondence with Alexander I, he repeatedly declared his loyalty to the idea of an alliance with Russia. However, what Napoleon continued to refer to as "allied ties" actually looked like a relationship of vassalage, which he tried in vain to impose on Russia. Napoleon was going to meet a war that was not caused by necessity or state interests, a war in which everything remained mysterious and unclear to him.

Vaguely aware of the dangers lurking in it, Napoleon hoped to fend them off and overcome them by overwhelming force. Catherine II's old idea of creating a coalition of European monarchies against revolutionary France was turned inside out by the Emperor of the French: he created a European coalition led by non-revolutionary France against Russia. It seemed to him that he had planned everything and calculated everything. He counted battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies. He counted the days, weeks, and months. But in deciding on this war, the most formidable and most dangerous of all that he had ever waged, Napoleon did not take into account the most important thing - the Russian people. He had obviously lost track of time, of hours. It was 1811, and then 1812. And he did not distinguish, did not hear in the "verb of times" that this year 1812 was to be the twelfth hour for him.

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