Moscow: Publishing House "International Relations". 1971. 270 pp. The print run is 25,000. Price 1 rub. 11 kopecks.

When it comes to fascist totalitarian regimes in Europe in the past or still existing today, first of all they are called Hitler, Mussolini, Franco. Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, as you know, were defeated during the Second World War. The Francoist regime in Spain, although it has lost its influence on the masses, is still held in power by a ruthless military-terrorist dictatorship. This circumstance largely explains the relentless interest of specialists in the recent history of Spain. What are the reasons for the" survivability " of the Francoist regime? What determined Spain's domestic and foreign policy in the past, especially during the Second World War, and largely determines it today? These and other issues are in the focus of researchers ' attention.

The recently published book by S. P. Pozharskaya, Candidate of Historical Sciences, senior researcher at the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, devoted to the foreign policy and diplomacy of Spain during the Second World War, will undoubtedly attract the attention of those who are interested in the history of this country. This book is the first monograph in Soviet and foreign historiography, which attempts to comprehensively study the foreign and domestic policy of Spain at that time. The source base of the work is very solid: numerous memoirs published primarily in the United States and England, the press of Spain and Western countries, the works of Spanish, English, American, German, French and Italian historians, collections of documents and materials published in the USSR and in the West, and the works of Soviet researchers. The book also uses materials from the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Central German Archive in Potsdam (GDR). Many documents were first introduced by the author into scientific circulation. The book has a detailed historiographical introduction.

S. P. Pozharskaya is not limited to the study of Spanish foreign policy and diplomacy. It provides, in fact, a thorough analysis of the entire Spanish history during these years. The author also goes beyond the chronological framework of the topic. The first chapter ("The road to power") examines the Spanish events of the early 1930s: the fall of the monarchy and the proclamation of the Republic, the civil war and Francoism before the Second World War; in the final sections of the last, fifth, chapter ("Why the vise did not close") - the post-war policy of Madrid until the signing of September 26, 1953 G. the American-Spanish military pact. Thus, we have almost 20 years of Spanish history, although the main focus of the monograph is devoted, of course, to the period of the Second World War.

One of the central problems of the book is the question of the reasons for Spanish neutrality during the Second World War. When Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and World War II broke out, Hitler and Mussolini hoped that Franco would join the Axis powers in gratitude for the help they had given him during the Spanish Civil War. But Franco chose to wait and decide on his country's policy in accordance with the course of the war. Speaking on Burgos Radio on September 4, Franco said that Spain "will maintain strict neutrality." The motives that prompted the Spanish dictator to avoid joining the war were explained in a report to Berlin given in the book by the German ambassador in Madrid, Stohrer. "The Caudillo," wrote Stoehrer, "seeks to avoid entering the war prematurely and, consequently, taking such a long part in it that it would be beyond the power of Spain, and under certain conditions would serve as a source of danger for the regime" (p.63).

As Pozharskaya points out, Spanish neutrality was eventually positively assessed by both the Axis powers and Western countries. The first was because they were 100% sure that this neutrality would be exclusively friendly, benevolent for Germany and Italy; the second was interested in Spain staying out of the military conflict and thereby preventing Hitler from taking important strategic positions on the Iberian Peninsula and capturing Gibraltar. Each of the warring parties believed that Franco would implement policies in its own interests. The book clearly shows that the main

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The trend of Madrid's foreign policy during World War II was not a pro-German or pro-Western orientation, but a desire to avoid any steps that could shake the very shaky foundations of the Francoist regime at home. "The extremely unstable internal political situation, which was fraught with serious dangers for the Francoist regime if the very shaky balance of power was disturbed at the slightest," the author writes, "was the main reason for Spain's refusal to actively participate in the war" (p.85).

On June 19, 1940, after the defeat of France and Italy's entry into the war, the Spanish government sent a memorandum to Berlin, in which, in particular, it announced Spain's readiness to take part in the war in the future, "if necessary." As a pre-payment for this, the book notes, Franco demanded to guarantee the transfer to Spain of Gibraltar, French Morocco, part of Algeria, including the Department of Oran, and the expansion of the Spanish colonies (p. 87). The Nazis, as is well known, reacted very coolly to Franco's claims, considering them excessive and unequal to the contribution that Spain can make to the "common cause of the Axis powers" in the event of its entry into the war, especially since the German command itself planned to capture not only Gibraltar, but also Spain itself. "Using the enthusiasm we aroused in Spain," Hitler said later in 1945, " and the blow we dealt to England, we should have attacked Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, immediately after the defeat of France. At the time, however, the disadvantage was that it would have been difficult to prevent Spain from entering the war on our side... To be honest, having Italy around your neck is already enough of a burden, and whatever the qualities of a Spanish soldier, Spain, given its poverty and lack of training, would be more of a burden than an acquisition. " 1 By the spring of 1941, when Germany was already actively preparing for war against the USSR, Hitler abandoned Operations Felix (the plan to capture Gibraltar) and Isabella (the plan to capture Spain and Portugal).

After the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the book notes, the Francoist government expressed "the greatest satisfaction in connection with the beginning of the struggle against Bolshevik Russia" and asked Hitler to allow volunteers from among the phalanx members to take part in the campaign against the USSR (pp. 104-105). Although Spain did not officially declare war on the Soviet Union, it actually took a direct part in it, sending the "Blue Division" to the Eastern Front. In chapter 3, for the first time in Soviet historiography, a complete picture of the inglorious campaign of the Falangist army against the USSR is recreated (the "Blue Division" was part of the Wehrmacht as the 250th Infantry Division). Of considerable interest are the archival materials cited by the author (primarily interviews with prisoners of war and defectors). They trace the evolution of the morale and mood of Spanish soldiers who found themselves in Soviet captivity and mostly claimed that they had adhered to "anti-Francoist" beliefs from the very beginning and were just waiting for the right opportunity to go over to the Red Army. In fact, as the book shows, the sobering up of the Blue Division soldiers who went to the Eastern Front in the hope of a quick and easy victory was the result of the crushing blows that the Red Army inflicted on the Wehrmacht. In total, according to S. P. Pozharskaya's calculations, more than 50 thousand people passed through the" Blue Division". On the scale of the Second World War, it was an entire army, and at the same time about 20 thousand soldiers and officers operated in it (p. 142).

The fourth chapter covers a wide range of issues, including Franco's foreign policy in 1941-1943, the policy of "balancing" between the "axis" and the "bloc" (Western powers), provides detailed information on Spain's economic relations with Germany and Italy, as well as with the states of the Anglo-American bloc, and on the internal the situation in Spain, and the anti-Francoist struggle led by the Communists. The Franco government, the author concludes, managed during this period not to succumb to pressure from the Axis powers and did not break economic and diplomatic relations with Western powers. Objectively, the Francoist regime played into the hands of the fear of the Axis powers and Western "democracies" that in the event of intervention in Spain, civil war could break out there, and possibly even war-

1 See Voprosy Istorii, 1965, No. 10, p. 126.

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a native war against the interventionists, led by the "reds". "Both in the ruling circles of the Axis powers and in the camp of their Western opponents," writes S. P. Pozharskaya, " there were serious concerns that the invasion of Spanish territory by any of the belligerents would lead to the strengthening of left - wing, democratic forces in the Pyrenees. And neither of them wanted that. On this issue, there was a truly touching unity of views in Washington, London and Berlin" (p.184).

The last chapter reveals the background of the double game of Spanish diplomacy, which did not want to reveal its cards either to the Western powers or to the Axis powers. From the spring of 1943 until the end of World War II, that is, during the period when the Wehrmacht was subjected to crushing blows from the Red Army, and the anti-Hitler coalition was increasingly strengthened, when first Italy and then Germany surrendered, Spain's foreign policy, as noted in the book, was characterized by a corresponding evolution. Although the Franco government has ostensibly maintained a policy of strict neutrality since 1943, its sympathies for the Axis powers, its close economic ties with Germany (and, above all, its supply of tungsten in exchange for weapons) have remained unchanged. Nevertheless, the joint venture writes. Pozharskaya, Franco considered it possible on November 3, 1944 to declare that Spain was never a Nazi or fascist country and was not associated with the Axis powers. He even expressed his willingness to cooperate with members of the anti-Hitler coalition in "restoring peace", clearly hinting at Spain's desire to participate in the peace conference (pp. 208-209). The author rightly emphasizes that Franco in this case proceeded from a very benevolent attitude of Western politicians, especially W. Churchill, towards Spain (p. 244). But memories of Franco's close allied relations with the European Axis powers were still fresh in the minds of the peoples. On June 19, 1945, at the UN Founding Conference in San Francisco, a resolution was approved to refuse admission to the UN of those countries whose political regimes were established with the help of the armed forces of the Axis countries. Based on this resolution, Spain's request for admission to the UN was not granted.

S. P. Pozharskaya's book is not without some omissions. The historiographical introduction in some cases contains references to facts from Spanish history, which the reader learns only from the main text of the book ("Sunier's visit to Berlin in September 1940 ... did not meet the expectations placed on him...", "Franco's refusal to take part in the Gibraltar operation", "the events of August 1942", "the 1953 treaty", etc. - see pages 11, 13, 15). It is puzzling why the book does not mention anything about the capitulation of Italy and the impact of this event on Spanish foreign policy. There is also insufficient coverage of Spain's policy towards neutral states, its attempts to compensate for its position as a country forced to maneuver between the Axis powers and the Western bloc, and its more active position towards countries that did not take part in World War II.

In general, the reviewed monograph significantly advances the study of the problems of the Second World War and coverage of the recent history of Spain, where the struggle of progressive forces against Francoism is still ongoing.

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