The aim of this article is to analyze the presence of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the public life, and the limits of such presence. The Church's high influence is in correlation with spreading its growing involvement in almost all areas of social life. The emphasis is made upon the role of the Orthodox Church in the political process, which is studied and interpreted on the basis of the sociological surveys. These data are further supported by the analysis of the opinions of civil society actors and the church sermons by the clergy. In addition, the article discusses the attitudes of young people toward the process of secularization. The article measures specific indicators, which, in our opinion, is the best way to identify value orientations of the Georgian youth. The surveys were carried out in 2014 and 2015.

Keywords: Georgian Orthodox Church, religion, secularism, institutional differentiation, modernization, democratization.

Research objectives

THE purpose of this article is to analyze the attitude of politicians, public figures, clergy and young people to the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church (hereinafter referred to as the GOC) in the political and public life of Georgia, to identify areas in which its intervention (or participation) is considered legitimate or illegal.

Charkviani T., Chelidze A. The Georgian Orthodox Church in the public sphere: Disputes about the boundaries of participation // State, religion, and Church in Russia and abroad. 2016. N2. pp. 107-132.

Charkviani, Tamar, Chelidze, Ana (2016) "Debating the Limits of the Georgian Church's Participation in Public Life", Gosudarstvo. religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 34(2): 107-132.

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At the moment, given the high level of trust that religion and the church enjoy in Georgia, questions naturally arise : what is the role of religious values/views in the process of democratizing society and the state? Do they contribute to the formation of the liberal-democratic principles proclaimed by the Georgian authorities? How can we understand the role of religion in the development of a democratic, rule-of-law state? While religion has become an important symbolic and cultural capital in modern Georgia, 1 it is important to understand the following: 1) what is the attitude of different social groups to the question of the limits of the influence (intervention) of the church in various social and state spheres; 2) whether the influence of the church as a social institution goes beyond just ideological rhetoric and what real role, therefore, the church plays in the political life of the state.

The current political system of Georgia, according to studies and ratings of various international organizations2, is described and evaluated as a "hybrid regime", as "partially free"; local experts also point out the shortcomings of democracy 3. Georgia is still in the process of socio-political transformation and the formation of new institutions. The acute conflict between traditional and modern values continues, which is replaced by compromises or adaptations, new configurations of coexistence of representatives of different faiths, ethnic groups, different values and worldviews are created. The transformation process paradoxically involves the opposite vectors of secularization and de-secularization.

In a modern society, classical theories of secularism and modernism "predict" a decline in the role of religion ("disenchanting the world"). Secularization is one of the most important elements at the stage of forming a modern democratic state. Nevertheless, in many societies, religion still remains not only "spiritual" but also an influential political force.

1. См. Bourdieu, P. (1986) "The Forms of Capital", in Richardson, J. (ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, pp. 241-258. New York: Greenwood.

2. См., например: Freedom in the World 2011: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (2011). New York: Freedom House.

3. See Nodia G. [Properties of hybrid regimes] / / [Solidaroba]. 2010. N3(36).

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In some even industrial societies (for example, in the United States), the membership of religious organizations not only did not decrease, but even increased. Since the 1980s, there has been an increase in religiosity in Eastern Europe and other former communist countries, and this trend has sharply increased since the collapse of the communist system4.

The process of secularization, being one of the challenges of modern Georgia, is a matter of wide discussion among Georgian scientists. Philosopher Giga Zedania explains that secularization in political and legal discourse has become a determining factor in the separation of church and state, which implies the so-called deinstitutionalization.5 Jurist Georgi Tumanishvili defines secularization as a process in which a sacred institution based on the transcendent becomes one of the sources of authoritative knowledge, along with others such as science, politics, etc., and a person gets a real opportunity to choose among these various competing sources, or even to neglect all of them. In a secular state, the church, as an institution, has its own specific place, role, functions and meaning, clearly defined boundaries. The state, according to the classical secular model, is neutral in relation to matters of faith, does not grant privileges to anyone, and does not provide financial support to any religion.6
An important indicator of the topic under study is the public discourse on the nature, "dose" and limits of church participation in public life. In this sense, a comparative analysis of modern and traditional forms of religiosity in the theory of "privatization of religion" by Thomas Lukman7 is of great importance. We are talking about the shift of religious meanings from the field of church teaching to more "mundane" spheres of life, their influence on the ideas of individual independence and human rights,

4. See Pollack, J. et al. (2003) Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe Attitudes in New Democracies. Aldershot.

5. Zedania G. [Secularization: concepts and contexts. Tbilisi: State University Press. Ilya], 2011.

6. Tumanishvili G. [Secularity is an awareness of the division of spaces, and secularization is the result of this division, which, in turn, is a process. Tbilisi], 2013.

7. см. Luckmann, T. (1967) Invisible Religion. New York: MacMillan.

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individuality and self-sufficiency. Accordingly, religiosity becomes less focused on the transcendental goals of the religious institution and more focused on the earthly problems of society and man.

Let's look at how these theoretical ideas can be applied to modern Georgia. The "rebirth of religion" seems obvious here. The factor of religion plays an important role in politics, cultural identity, values, attitudes towards minorities, in any public activity; religion has become a prominent and active subject within the public space. According to T. Parsons, religious institutions have not so much lost influence as become more specialized, while retaining important functions.8
In the course of our research, we asked ourselves: how do the social values offered by the church relate to what is commonly considered "civic values"? How widespread is the belief that the sphere of influence of the Orthodox Church in Georgia covers (or should cover) both public and private spheres? One of the components identified by Jose Casanova in the theory of secularization is the principle of institutional differentiation of the so-called secular spheres, such as the state, economy and science, from religious institutions and norms. Religion and the church perform a number of functions and play a certain role in society. At the same time, the concepts of "functions" and "role" are related, but not identical. Functions are the ways in which the church acts in society, and the role is the total result and consequences of performing its functions. The social functions of the Georgian Orthodox Church can be defined as the ways in which it influences society as a whole and its individual institutions. The totality of the functions of the church determines the social role that this institution plays in society as a whole.

Let us emphasize the political function of the church, which primarily determines, in our opinion, the social role of religion. It is not so much about the political views that are generated by religious teaching, but rather the role of the church as an institution that always takes a certain political position and can give religion a political sound.

8. See Kodua E. et al. [ed.] [Dictionary of social and political terms]. Tbilisi: Logos, 2004. p. 351.

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The political function of religion consists in the fact that religion acts as an arbiter in a dispute between opposing political forces, can orient its adherents to an active or passive position in political matters, and conducts some political and ideological activities.9 In a specific Georgian case, the political function of the church can manifest itself in the following ways: in the Patriarchate's speeches addressing the people and the head of state on topical issues of the state's domestic and foreign policy; in supporting candidates for the post of head of state or individual parties during elections; in the Patriarchate's active participation in state affairs; in developing and improving exercises based on changing conditions. The level of real and acceptable political participation of the church indicates the level of secularization in the country as a whole and secularism as a political principle.

Research methodology

This article is based on the data of sociological research, triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods, their logical synthesis and combined use.

The first part of the empirical data collection involved qualitative sociological research - in-depth interviews, and their subject matter was the respondents ' opinions and assessments regarding the public role of the GOC and the degree of its participation in the political life of the country. The analysis of in-depth interviews not only provides an opportunity to assess the specifics of the social role and functions of the church in Georgia, but also reveals how this issue is expressed in the current discourse of politicians and clergy. The sample of respondents surveyed was targeted. The main principle of sampling was the presence of respondents ' awareness of the above-mentioned issues, the relevance of their knowledge in terms of research goals. The respondents ' profession and field of activity were chosen as the relevance indicator. Accordingly, a small group of people with specific characteristics and experience was selected. It included political figures, leading specialists and scientists (mainly theologians and sociologists), representatives of civil society engaged in religious education, and other organizations. -

9. Dorofeev F. A. Sotsial'nye funktsii religii [Social functions of religion]. 2010.

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religious issues, as well as members of the Orthodox clergy. A total of 20 in-depth interviews were conducted.

We also conducted a secondary analysis of existing documentary materials and data from existing empirical studies. The main focus was on research on the influence of the church, its political participation and other issues related to religion in Georgia. A significant part of the analysis of documentary materials was the study of sermons by Orthodox clergy, which made it possible to analyze the typical discourse of the clergy; for the analysis, we used mainly sermons published in Internet resources and the press.

We also used the results of the international project "Religion and Human Rights 2.0" conducted in Georgia in August 2014, along with 25 other countries, based on a Memorandum signed by Ilia State University (Tbilisi) and Würzburg University. Specifically in Georgia, the sample consisted of 1,000 respondents. The participation of one of the authors in this project as a member of the research group gives us the opportunity to analyze the data obtained 10.

The Georgian Orthodox Church as a political institution

In a State where there is a dominant religion, the church claims the right to participate actively in political life. The GOC Patriarchate has recently been actively involved in current political processes and declares itself the foundation of Georgian statehood and national identity.11
The potential of authority that the GOC uses in its socio-political and economic activities can be defined as a set of cultural symbols and archetypes,

10. The materials of the secondary sociological research (documents, research data, etc.) were processed using qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis approaches. Quantitative data were processed using the SPSS statistical program. The analysis of these results is based on a descriptive procedure, as well as the method of interpretation and conceptualization, data grouping, typology, correlation analysis, etc.

11. Matsaberidze M. [Political system of Georgia. Topic 9. Material of the course of lectures-Church and State]. Tbilisi, 2014. p. 3.

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principles of public morals and norms of behavior, basic elements of the historical memory of the people and forms of state and social structure, one way or another rooted in the Georgian Orthodox tradition. Authority and its highest form - trust - become, in the context of expanding the borders of democracy and the development of civil society, the main measure of the effectiveness of the social system.

At this stage, the GOC enjoys great prestige in society. According to a 2014 survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Orthodox Church has the highest level of public confidence - 94%. For comparison, 82% of respondents trusted the police, 69% trusted the Cabinet of Ministers, 64% trusted the presidential administration, and 37% trusted political parties.12 The personal rating of the head of the church, Catholicos - Patriarch Ilia II, is also exceptionally high, which is always much higher than the rating of politicians. According to a September 2013 poll by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Elijah II was leading in the ranking of politicians with 94%. When asked why the patriarch appears in the poll on political ratings, Luis Navarro, director of the NDI office in Georgia, notes: : "In our research, in the survey - whether someone likes it or not-there is always a patriarch, because this is a figure who from time to time makes statements about various political steps of Georgia and measures taken by the authorities." In the question "How do you assess his activities", the leadership of Ilia II is even more remarkable (due to the large gap between the other candidates)-71% of respondents said that they rate the patriarch's activities "very well"13.

In recent years, during the tense internal political confrontation that began in 2012 between the ruling National Movement party and the newly formed Georgian Dream coalition, the GOC has actually had to assume the function of neutralizing the situation and calling on the parties to refrain from using force. The Church and its head acted as a kind of arbiter between political forces. In January 2013, the Chairman of the Parliament

12. International Republican Institute (IRI) (2014) [http://agenda.ge/news/11621/eng, accessed on 1.03.2016]

13. National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2013). [Translation: Public opinion in Georgia] [https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Sept20l3-Political-Survey-Report-GEO.pdf, accessed on 1.03.2016].

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Georgian President David Usupashvili said that due to shortcomings in the political system of Georgia, the Patriarch had to take on such functions that are not part of his duties. In April 2013, during the so-called "co-existence period", when the parliamentary majority was represented by the ruling Georgian Dream party, and Mikhail Saakashvili was still president, Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II stated::

Recently, the role of political parties has come to the fore. These parties are so opposed to each other that they have forgotten about Georgia. A person may have different political beliefs. This is permissible and it should be so, but do not forget that our people and our homeland stand behind us. I believe that our young people are wise and see more deeply the problems facing the country 14.

Since 2012, the clergy have been very active in the political sphere, which was expressed in direct support of certain political forces by priests, and in many cases even in participation in rallies. No political force could ignore this participation.15 At the same time, the GOC has always maintained that it is outside politics, does not adhere to any political ideology, does not participate in the political activities of the state and society, because all this is a worldly sphere that has nothing to do with the spiritual sphere in which the church operates.

In some cases, the GOC tried to distance itself from supporting any particular political force: for example, in May 2010, the GOC Synod asked all political parties not to use the authority of the Patriarch and the Church in their political interests. Prior to the parliamentary elections in June 2012, the Holy Synod decided to declare the participation of clergy categorically unacceptable.-

14. II [Political parties are so opposed to each other that they have forgotten about Georgia-Ilia II] / / Geonews.ge. 25.04.2013 [http://geonews.ge/geo/news/story/39359 " mimachnia_rom_chveni_axalagazrdioba_brzenia, accessed from 1.03.2016].

15. Matsaberidze M. [Political system of Georgia]. P. 34.

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in shares of any political party. The minutes of the meeting of the Holy Synod on July 5, 2012 stated::

The Church has always been the unifying force of the country, and this function is especially needed in Georgia during the pre-election period. That is why it is absolutely unacceptable for clergymen to participate in political actions of any political party. The Church is neutral, universal and its members are people of all political views 16.

A similar resolution was adopted by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church earlier, when the ban on political activities of the clergy was broader in nature. In 2003, Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II, together with the Holy Synod, addressed then-President Eduard Shevardnadze and the Georgian Parliament:

Any clergyman, layman, or political force who tries to portray the church as a supporter of any party, intentionally or not, is acting against the national interests and position of the church. Therefore, according to the decision of the Holy Synod, the clergy are prohibited from membership in a particular political bloc, party and their public support.17
It should be noted that, according to various groups of our respondents-experts and representatives of civil society - the desire of the clergy to interfere and influence the political life of the country is so great that they often ignore this decision of the Holy Synod. The same part of respondents claims that the main reason why the neutrality proclaimed by the church was not observed was that the GOC and the Holy Synod did not punish members of the clergy who openly violated the synodal decree.: "The Patriarch was loyal to the behavior of priests or bishops engaged in political campaigning, whereas in cases of violation of the law, the Patriarch was not a member of the Orthodox Church.

16. [Minutes of the session of the Holy Synod. Georgia. Tbilisi], 2015 [http://www.ghn.ge/print.php?print=70187, accessed from 1.03. 2016].

17. Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia / / Tabula Magazine. 15.10.2012 [http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/62181-dagme-misha, accessed from 1.03.2016]

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in other synodal decisions, the church was much stricter in defending its own decisions. " 18
Mikhail Botkoveli, the Patriarch's secretary, responded evasively to such accusations:

It would be a violation of the decision of the Holy Synod if they [clergy] made political statements and appeals, but if they, like ordinary people, get acquainted with the election program, I do not see this as a crime. Priests are ordinary people, citizens of Georgia, and they are interested in the fate of the country. Consequently, as voters, they have their own sympathies for specific political parties... I must emphasize that the priest's statement does not mean that this is the position of the Church...19.

The lack of neutrality is particularly relevant to the actions of the clergy before the key elections of 2012, when, despite the above-mentioned decision of the Synod, the priests were openly and actively involved in pre-election politics. Clergymen of all ranks openly expressed sympathy for any political entity and agitated in its favor. The clergy, as well as parishioners, were divided into two political groups that supported the rival parties "National Movement"or" Georgian Dream". For example, the confrontation between two groups was revealed in the Diocese of Poti and Khob in connection with the consecration of the office of the Georgian Dream party by its supporter, one of the local clergy, Father Konstantin. This fact has received a lot of public publicity, especially in social networks. In this regard, Archbishop Grigol (Berbichashvili)of the Diocese of Poti and Khob he gave his subordinate a serious verbal reprimand. Here is an excerpt from Archbishop Grigol's sermon:

Yes, well, bless this party, but what does it mean to put it on the Internet?! This means that Father Constantine and all the clergy are on your side! You must not do this, and do not leave the Temple of the Lord!.. I had a very strict conversation with Father Constance-

18. Source: Interview with one of the respondents.

19. Sigua S. [Priest and politics-Sunday pre-election sermons]. 07.24.2012. [http://www.for.ge/view.php?for_id=14732& cat=9, accessed from 1.03.2016].

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I told him that under no circumstances did the clergy have the right to bless any party. I also told him that what he did was a political blessing!.. I told Father Constantin that without my blessing, he should not have consecrated Ms. Eki Besselia's office. After that, I gave my blessing for all the clergy, with Father Constantine at their head, to visit all the parties and consecrate and bless them. Gentlemen, use your own authority and rights. There is also another fact: one of the politicians says that he will release the churches. [B. Ivanishvili, the leader of the "Georgian Dream", spoke about freeing the Church from state interference at the actions in Batumi. - Auth.] From whom will it release?! From monks, priests, or anyone? Leave the Church alone. She doesn't need your help, and stop lying!20

Prior to this incident, four priests in the Diocese of Poti and Khob refused to consecrate the office of the Georgian Dream party. Archbishop Grigol (Berbichashvili) had a banner of Mikheil Saakashvili displayed in the courtyard of the newly built cathedral in Poti. The journalist who asked the question in this regard was the victim of physical abuse by priests accompanying the local bishop. The Patriarch's secretary said that Archbishop Grigol is an open supporter of the"National Movement".

"I will not vote for the political force that believes that there is a problem of democracy in Georgia," Metropolitan Avraham of the Western European Diocese said to the emigrants gathered in the Georgian chapel in Munich. Together with Metropolitan Avraham, the most active supporter of the "National Movement" was Metropolitan Kallistrate (Margalitashvili), who repeatedly compared President Saakashvili to Georgian Tsar David the Builder.

One of the respondents in a conversation with us noted that the head of the Cathedral named after him. In his Sunday sermon on St. Nicholas in Karelia, Father Stefan directly appealed to his parish to support the Georgian Dream coalition. Otherwise, he threatened to keep them out of the temple. Also informants

20. Sermon of the Primate of the Diocese of Poti and Khob, Archbishop Grigol (Berbichashvili) [https://soundcloud.com/ts-press/28-08-2012, accessed on 1.03.2016]

21. [Curse Misha] //Tabula magazine. 15.10.2012 [http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/62181-dagme-misha, accessed on 1.03.2016].

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They tell about the statement of the head of the Shavnabad monastery, Archimandrite Shio (Gabrichidze), at a Sunday sermon: "So that I don't see anyone who doesn't like the president enter here. So that I don't see any devils at the next liturgy. Anyone who doesn't like the president is the devil."22 These and similar cases were widely discussed in the press.

Conversely, the clergy's support for the "Georgian Dream" was often expressed in the presentation of its opponents as accomplices of the negative influence of the West, which threatens the true Orthodox values in Georgia. Before the 2012 parliamentary elections, after the publication of scandalous images of torture of prisoners in prisons23, Archbishop Spiridon (Abuladze) of the Skhalt Eparchy stated that "homosexuals and Western ambassadors"demanded torture from the Georgian government. The revealed sadistic facts in the penitentiary system, which are a violation of human rights and freedoms and Western values, were presented in the sermons of the clergy, on the contrary, as evidence of the "spiritual occupation" of Georgia by Western countries. Many clergymen expressed themselves like Archbishop Spyridon. Clergymen who preach anti-Western values and their parishioners discussed the problem in this context.

Where does this evil and filth come from? Those who order, those who give money to these people of ours, politicians and the government, they order it. You know that the parade of these, I apologize, pederasts, gays and lesbians was in Tbilisi and they came out with a protest, these mushroom-growing ambassadors of America, Britain, Holland, France, and said, how dare you tell them not to do this, how? let them do it. That's where it all comes from, that's who is the satanic author of it all 24.

According to many respondents, authors, journalists and civil society activists, in the parliamentary elections of October 1, 2012, the GOC as a whole, in fact, supported the Georgian Dream coalition and, thus, played an important role in its victory.

22. Source: Interview with one of the respondents.

23. Before the 2012 parliamentary elections, several TV channels released videos of torture of prisoners in Gldan prison No. 8 in Tbilisi, which led to popular unrest and resignations.

24. [Curse Misha]

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This support was also evident on election day. In any case, we saw how priests moved from one polling station to another, threatened with excommunication all those who falsify the election results, and threatened representatives of the "National Movement" at the polling stations. "Curse Misha, curse Misha "(M. Saakashvili), the priest called one of the participants, behind whom the crowd stood and shouted that the liberals ' time was up 25. In the electoral process, active Orthodox groups fought in favor of the Georgian Dream, which gave this bloc a great advantage.

According to respondents, one of the reasons for this choice made by the clergy was the criticism of the Orthodox Church by Mikhail Saakashvili and some members of the"National Movement". On July 5, 2011, the law "On the Rules of Registration of Religious Communities as Legal entities of public Law" was adopted, but the position of the Orthodox Church was not taken into account. At the time, most opposition parties called on President Saakashvili to veto the law passed by Parliament, which he did not do.26
The clergy who supported the Saakashvili government represented a less active part of the church than the anti-Western religious group gathered around the Archbishop, Metropolitan Job (Akiashvili) of the Ruiz-Urbnis eparchy. According to respondents, this religious group has the highest social capital, they are ready to take to the streets for the sake of their ideas, mobilize their parishes and physically or verbally defend their positions.

Attitude of the State towards the Georgian Church

The extent and effectiveness of the political function of the church depends not only on its own social activity, but also on the attitude of the state towards it. Political parties and their leaders, in turn, do not neglect the use of religion for political purposes. The highest leaders of the state have repeatedly demonstrated their personal attitude to the church and their membership in it. The Church as the guardian of the nation-

25. [Curse Misha]

26. Matsaberidze M. [Political system of Georgia]. P. 35.

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cultural and spiritual traditions have a powerful potential for political authority. Periodically, and during election periods regularly and very compulsively, the elite of almost all centers of power and groups of influence demonstrate their belonging to the GOC, hoping for a massive response "recognition effect". The political elite, addressing the voters, as it were, declares: "I (the power elite) share the same cultural values and customs as you... I go to the same church, pray to the same God, speak the same language, love and follow the same traditions. Therefore, I am understandable and recognizable to you. So you have to respect me, listen to me, and vote for me. " 27
Georgian society sees examples of this almost every week, when leaders of opposing political parties present their own interpretations of the sermons of Elijah II to the public and thus try to get political dividends. 28 According to the assessment of the philosopher and cultural critic Zaal Andronikashvili:

The patriarchy was able to play an important role in post-totalitarian society. In such a society, the mass that has lost the ability to organize itself tends to seek institutions that have a stable structure. In Georgia, such a structure is the Church. Politicians in Georgia have not been able to become independent professionals. Therefore, their authority depends on external legitimation, which is given not by their professionalism, but by the status of a "good Georgian" and "true Orthodox". The church puts a similar "seal" on their foreheads... Today, religiosity is not only an ideology, but also a fashion. It is rare to find a politician (regardless of what he believes or does not believe) who does not pose in the background of icons, does not visit a priest, and does not publicly express his loyalty to the Patriarchate. 29
27. See: Zaichenko A. The authority of the Church as a political resource of power. Religare.ru. 04.11.2003 [http://www.religare.ru/2_7211.html, accessed from 1.03.2016].

28. Okropiridze N. [The role of religion in politics]. 2013 [http://www.grassroots.ge/doc/NiniOkropiridze.pdf, доступ от 1.03.2016].

29. Andronikashvili Z. [The Church as an "authority"] // Radiotavisupleba.ge. 15.11.2013 [http://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/content/zaal-andronikashvili-blog/25169449.html, accessed on 1.03.2016]

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The Church, as an additional source of political legitimacy, was necessary for all governments and political forces. It should be noted that the attitude of the Saakashvili government towards the GOC was mainly based on political pragmatism. During this period, the influence of the GOC increased. The demonstration of support for the church was very important for the government, for example, in 2009, after the war with Russia, when Saakashvili tripled the funding of the GOC30. The government returned and gave her church lands, built her temples, and provided the top hierarchy with personal luxuries. "This money shows that (President Saakashvili) hopes for the support of (the patriarch) in times of difficulties," one of the church's opponents noted in this regard.31 According to theologian and chairman of the Council of Religious Minorities under the Ombudsman Beki Mindiashvili:

The very fact that the church has been a source of informal legitimation of political power since the 1990s already means that it really has a lot of influence... The government and the church form a single dome, and if the government remains loyal to the church, then the attitude of citizens, despite internal differences, will still be pro-government, because their ideological space is one.32
At the end of 2011, after Bidzina Ivanishvili made a statement that he was going into politics, he first visited the Catholicos-Patriarch, who presented him with a precious icon, and during a meeting with journalists noted that he was an Orthodox Christian.

A certain part of the Georgian political spectrum considers Christian democracy as its ideology. During the restoration of state independence, first President Zviad Gamsakhurdia stated when defining his political beliefs:: "I'm a Christian Democrat." By 2014 in Georgia

30. See: TI Georgia. 04 July 2013. An overview of public financing provided to the Georgian Patriarchate [http://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/overview-public-financing-provided-georgian-patriarchate, accessed on 1.03.2016]

31. Matsaberidze M. 33. [Political system of Georgia], p. 33.

32. Theologian, Chairman of the Council of Religious Minorities under the Ombudsman Beka Mindiashvili. Interview.

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There are 10 registered political parties whose names include the words "Christian Democrats". Among them, the Christian Democratic Movement (led by Giorgi Targamadze) enjoyed the greatest success in the 2008 parliamentary elections, gaining 8.66% of the vote. Before the 2012 parliamentary elections, some parties (for example, "Future Georgia", "European Democrats of Georgia") demanded that Orthodoxy be declared the state religion. In the 2013 presidential election, three presidential candidates (Giorgi Targamadze, Levan Chachua and Mikheil Salushvili) demanded the same thing. However, the Orthodox Church itself always refrains from this demand, stating that it is fully satisfied with the terms of the constitutional agreement with the state (the so-called "concordat" of 2002), which confirms the special role of the Orthodox Church for Georgia.33
With or without the support of the GOC, it is in any case destructive for the image of politicians to go against the authority of the church. Constitutional lawyer Vakhushti Menabde believes:

Currently, the appeal of politicians to religion in pre-election rhetoric is not particularly able to bring votes due to the fact that this factor is more or less used by all political forces. I think that criticism of religion and the Orthodox Church can lead to a politician losing more votes than praise would bring. Today, it is easy to lose votes through negative rhetoric, but it is much more difficult to gain votes through positive appeal.34
Review and interpretation of studies on youth religiosity in Georgia

One of the main questions in the study of religion in modern society is whether it has a resource that contributes to its development.

33. Matsaberidze M. [Political system of Georgia]. P. 33.

34. Vakhushti Menabde. Interview.

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association of the company?35 In 2012, the Institute for Political Studies published a study of the dynamics of changing values in different generations in Georgia. According to the study leaders, the aim of the study was to determine the difference in values between generations in terms of the goals of democratization. The survey showed a lack of democratic practice and a low level of civic engagement. According to the head of the study, Nana Sumbadze, " the population recognizes democratic values, but does not see the possibility of their implementation in the country." "A widespread sense of powerlessness and indifference, nihilism" 36.

The majority of respondents are supporters of the unity of the secular and religious spheres. Almost half (49%) believe that politicians who do not believe in God should not be elected to high government positions. According to the author of the study, for the majority of respondents, Christianity is more a basis for identity (66%) than citizenship (34%). The majority (53%) do not agree that religious leaders should not interfere in the country's governance.

According to the study, along with the decrease in age, collectivist attitudes also decrease, and mixed and individualistic attitudes gradually increase. In this regard, Nana Sumbadze notes one paradox: the age group of 18-24 years, compared to the older generation, is more religious and less tolerant of representatives of other religions. The same cohort is more open to sexual and ethnic minorities, and supports the ideas of gender equality; however, in the religious sphere, their attitudes are less tolerant 37.

Sociologist Khatia Nadaraya explains this data by correlating it with the human Development Index: "The World Values Survey, which is conducted all over the world, shows that countries where the human development index is low - meaning life expectancy, education,

35. См. Habermas, J. (2011) "The Political: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology", in Mendieta, E. and VanAntwerpen, J. (eds.) The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, pp. 15-33. New York: Columbia University Press.

36. См. Sumbadze, N. Genartions and Values. Public Policy Studies.

37. Ibid.

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the level of poverty - that is, developing countries-is characterized by a low level of understanding of the differentiation of secular and religious values." In her opinion, religiosity is a means for young people to integrate into society: "Religiosity is a resource for adapting to the dominant social norms and gaining recognition. It is considered that if you are a believer, then you are "honest", "good", "acceptable" " 38. Professor of the State University named after him. Ilia Sergo Ratiani connects religious growth with the destruction of the education system and other institutions in the post-Soviet period: "The youth surveyed is the generation that did not attend a normal school or university. The educational system was destroyed, authority was lost, but the church had authority. " 39
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to chaos, worsening economic conditions, and a sharp revaluation of values. In such a situation, as a rule, the search for a strong and benevolent authority begins. This turned out to be the church, which significantly increased the degree of its legitimacy in independent Georgia. Not surprisingly, the church's influence was greater on the generation that was in the process of personal growth and formation at that time. We believe that this explains the greater religiosity of the younger generation, compared to the older 40.

In October-November 2014, we conducted the above-mentioned study of senior secondary school students and undergraduate students of higher educational institutions throughout Georgia. The study focused on the attitude of young people to the influence and participation of the Georgian Orthodox Church in various spheres of public life. To analyze the overall influence of the church, the following areas were identified: the influence of the authority of religion on social processes; the influence of religious leaders on political decisions, in particular, their moral statements; and the adaptability of religion to trends in social change.

38. Sociologist Khatia Nadaraia. Interview.

39. Professor Sergo Ratiani. Interview.

40. См. Sumbadze, N. (2012) Genartions and Values. Public Policy Studies. Tbilisi.

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Various social groups and actors take part in the formation of the organization of the social sphere. The model and form of constructing social relations gives us an idea of values and attitudes. The way young people see the functions of religion and, consequently, the church, provides important data on the limits of clergy participation and influence on the formation of today's Georgian society.

Table 1. Functions of religion (%)

Indicator

I totally disagree

I don't agree

I'm not sure

I agree

I totally agree

Religion should try to influence public opinion about social issues

23,3

21,7

30,7

14,8

9,5

Religion must publicly stand up for the lower strata of society

11,4

12,7

28,6

26,7

20,6

A religion must take responsibility for the spiritual growth of its members

1,6

4,9

12,4

27,6

53,5

Religion must take joint responsibility with the state for our national culture

5,2

7,3

19,2

30,1

38,2

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Religion must keep pace with new ideas in society

18,8

19,6

31,4

18,3

12,0

Religion should use its authority to interfere in public affairs

26,4

19,8

26,3

16,4

11,0

Religion should create a space for deep spiritual experiences

2,7

5,0

18,7

34,0

39,6

Religion must assume responsibility for social development

12,3

18,7

36,2

20,2

12,5

Religion should consolidate the nation against the influence of other countries and to protect the country's traditions

13,3

13,3

24,4

25,7

23,3

Religion must keep pace with the trends of social change

16,7

16,7

37,6

17,1

12,0

An analysis of the indicators shown in Table 1 shows that young people consider the following as the main functions of religion and the church:: responsibility for the spiritual growth of its members - 81.1%; creating a space for deep spiritual experiences-73.6%;-

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taking joint responsibility with the state for national culture - 68.3%; consolidating the nation against the influence of other countries and taking care of the country's traditions-49%. On the contrary, according to respondents, the functions of religion and the church include the following: religion should use its authority to interfere in public issues-46.2%; religion should try to influence public opinion on social issues-45%; religion should keep pace with changing ideas in society-38.4%. Despite the fact that young people do not see the function of religion in influencing public opinion about social problems and in interfering in public life, advice from religious leaders to civil servants is considered legitimate - 54.4% of respondents. Only 14.3% consider this unacceptable. Criticism of religious authorities is acceptable for a relatively small number of respondents-31.4%; this once again confirms the role of opinions that religious leaders express on various social or political issues (see table 2).

Table 2. Influence of religious leaders (%)

Indicator

I totally disagree

I don't agree

I'm not sure

I agree

I totally agree

Politicians can ask religious leaders for advice on any ethical issue, but they must decide for themselves

5,9

8,4

31,3

32,6

21,8

Most of those who criticize state and religious authorities only create unnecessary doubts in people's minds

15,5

15,9

43,9

16,2

8,4

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In general, as we can see, the indicator of approval of the church's influence in the state and public sphere is relatively small.

As shown by the above data, the issue of adaptability of religion in a transforming reality is less important - 29.1% (see Table 1) and is not considered by young people as the main function of the church. According to the data shown in Table 3, according to the opinion of young people, the role of religion in modern society is still great, although many respondents (44.3%) are undecided about whether modern society hinders the "search for religious meanings"; however, 71.4% of respondents agree with the opinion that religion is important for maintaining a high level of religious awareness. morals in modern society. The majority of respondents disagree with the opinion that religious beliefs, rituals and symbols do not fit into "modernity" (59.4%) and that religion is a "relic" of the past (48.7%).

Table 3. Religion in modern society (%)

Indicator

I totally disagree

I don't agree

I'm not sure

I agree

I totally agree

Modern society promotes rather than hinders the need to search for religious meanings

16,6

22,4

44,3

12,2

4,5

Religious beliefs, rituals, and symbols don't fit in with our modernity

36,4

23,0

25,5

10,3

4,7

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It is good for the morals of modern society that religion exists

4,7

7,0

16,8

31,5

39,9

Religion is a "relic" of the past

35,1

13,6

15,1

17,0

19,3

The results of the study showed that the value orientations of quite a large part of young people are in the process of formation. This conclusion is based on high percentages of the "not sure" response for almost all the indicators we have identified. This "uncertainty" in one's own position can, apparently, be considered the main conclusion of the study. The opinion of a large part of young people about the limits and influence of the church is uncertain. On the other hand, the part that has a more established and clear position legitimizes the broad scope of the church's influence.

Conclusion

An analysis of the social and political functions of the Church shows that since the 1990s religion has played a particularly important role in the social and political life of Georgia. Political bans on religion were lifted, and since Georgian society was experiencing a deep moral and value crisis in transition, many turned to religion as a way to overcome this crisis. As a result, religious institutions have a significant influence not only in the field of worldview, but also in the socio-political sphere. The opinion of the church often plays a crucial role in discussing social and political issues, religiosity has become an important feature of political leaders, and clergymen have become spiritual leaders for many Georgians.

On the other hand, we were interested in the positions of the younger generation regarding the role and function of the Orthodox Church. As our research shows, quite a large part of respondents, when assessing secular values, identify not only those who are not religious, but also those who are not religious.-

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confidence, lack of a well-established opinion. Apparently, these people are in the process of forming value orientations. We believe this is an important factor for the continuation of democratic reforms. If democratic values are strengthened in the country and society as a whole, in the long run, the part of young people who are currently in uncertainty may make a choice in favor of secular values, while the opposite choice is likely to be associated with a weakening of the democratic discourse. However, at this stage, we do not undertake to predict how social processes will develop in general and, accordingly, what kind of choice the vacillating part of young people will make.

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